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Abstract
The research looks at whether the development of carbon markets as a key policy instrument to
address climate change can be explained by the participation of non-state private market actors in
decision-making processes at the institutional level. It looks at the underlying interests and stakes
that both states and private non-state market actors have had in carbon trading, the role that states
and businesses play in these markets and the implications that the adoption of this instrument has
had, in terms of controversies regarding accountability, transparency and justice issues. Through
investigating the role of one major private carbon market actor, BP, in policymaking processes,
this study provides an example of how corporate interests influenced policy at the institutional
level. The main hypothesis is that private non-state market actors influenced state policy in terms
of adopting carbon markets designed to benefit and to prevent harm to corporate interests. This
is done through mechanisms in which states acted to provide the conditions for effective market
conduct, leaving it to market actors to implement the expected results according to their own
standards with minimum state control. Market actors, on the other hand, expected states to
provide a strong legal framework as well as the political legitimation necessary for market
processes by which they could make profits and establish mechanisms for environmental selfregulation. The research uses elements from critical theory and eco-Marxist perspectives to shed
light on the neoliberal framework in which these processes have taken place.
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Introduction: Carbon Markets as Regulation Strategy

Carbon pollution is the biggest contributor to human-caused climate change. Scientists have
particularly pointed to the role that burning oil, gas and coal is playing in contribution to the
problem. Back in 1990, it was reported by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change that
an immediate reduction of 60%-80% of carbon emissions was necessary in order to stabilize
carbon concentrations in the atmosphere (IPCC 1990, xviii, 5). Since the conclusion of the Kyoto
agreement, a consensus has emerged around a new regime for addressing climate change which
has carbon markets and emissions trading as its center policy. States have adopted a strategy
which, to a large part, leaves it to market forces to determine the allocation of responsibilities
and commitments to reduce sources of greenhouse gas emissions (Bernstein et. al 2010; Lederer
2012). This allowed governments to develop mandatory, yet flexible, market-based climate
policies (Meckling 2011, 27). Despite the collapse in prices for carbon offsets in the form of
Certified Emission Reductions from over €20 in 2008 to a record low of €0.13 in April 2013,
carbon offset projects have continued to turn in thousands of carbon credits, contributing to the
meeting of emission reduction obligations, without the actual cutting of emissions at their source
(Ervine 2015, 247). The global value of carbon pricing instruments today is estimated at almost
US$50 billion (World Bank 2015a).
The development of the current emissions trading system with the chance to ‘offset’ greenhouse
gas emission reduction has been a major innovation in governance policy with regard to the
change in concepts, institutions and practices that it entails (Voß 2007, 330). The famous Stern
Review with early advocacy for the widespread adoption of carbon trading (2006), was endorsed
by the UK government, and carbon trading was considered the “central element” of the UK
government’s emissions reduction framework (Baldwin 2008, 262; Department of Trade and
Industry 2006, 30). Even in developing countries, carbon markets gained momentum, especially
in important emerging economies like China and India (Mehling 2012, 277), both of which have
had their leaders promoting carbon offset projects on their territories (Michaelowa and Buen
2012, 6-7).
Regulation through this trading system is sometimes viewed as both a market approach and
‘command-and-control’ regulation. While it is states that determine how scarce environmental
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goods are to become (Lohmann 2005, 206), non-state market actors take action based on marketbased considerations. Politicians, business leaders and activists seek to harness market
opportunities through creating incentives for businesses to find the cheapest way to cut their
carbon emissions and to fund ‘green’ initiatives as best suits their corporate interests. The
emerging carbon market has been constructed as the favorable alternative to state negotiations on
a consensus-based, comprehensive, multilateral, binding agreement to enforce compliance on
greenhouse gas emissions. This research therefore uses carbon markets as a case study to look at
the ongoing development in the international environmental regime in which corporate activities
expand governance beyond state control (Okereke, Bulkeley and Schroeder 2009, 58; Prakash
2000), and in which corporate power is gaining influence on shaping international politics at the
institutional level (Dauvergne and Lister 2010, 146).
This is occurring within a larger trend toward market-based environmental governance, away
from hierarchical state regulation and toward softer public-private partnership-based regulation
(Lövbrand, Rindefjäll and Nordqvist 2009). Other important issue-areas where market-based
mechanisms are facilitated by political action or are increasingly assuming a more significant
role than direct government regulation include market-based water governance (Thampapillai
2009) and global forest governance (Dauvergne and Lister 2010). This market-driven regulation
commonly operates through standards-based self-regulation, whereby firms seek market
advantage through cost-based or differentiation-related market considerations (Eisner 2011).
This relates to a trend where voluntarism is privileged over direct government regulation, in the
process threatening the taking of definite effective regulatory measures (Ervine 2015, 250).
Carbon markets are markets in permits to emit greenhouse gases or markets in credits earned for
not emitting them (MacKenzie 2009, 440). The global framework for carbon markets was first
established by the Kyoto Protocol, considered to be the one of the most important political
milestone in international climate politics to date, establishing legally binding emission reduction
targets (Böhm, Misoczky and Moog 2012, 1620), as well as ‘flexibility’, market-based,
mechanisms for achieving them1. Although early proposals for carbon trading projected a
‘global’ carbon market, stagnation in multilateral negotiations and the fact that the US did not
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The reduction targets were set for a group of countries consisting of the most industrialized countries which
ratified the treaty, also called Annex-1 countries.
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ratify Kyoto contributed to the currently fragmented system with regional emission trading
schemes set up in Europe, North America and in the Asia/ Pacific region (Bernstein et al. 2010,
165). Efforts are, however, directed toward linking these fragmented regional markets and
merging them into one global carbon market. These linkages are already underway, facilitated by
the sharing of one trading unit, the carbon credit, representing the right to emit one ton of carbon
dioxide (measured by a unit of account called tCO2e, the ton of carbon dioxide equivalent), by
almost all currently existing carbon markets, in order to allow for and facilitate direct exchange
(Bernstein et al. 2010, 166; IPCC 2014, 86).
The EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is the world’s largest ‘cap-and-trade’ system and
the world’s largest carbon market. It was primarily designed to meet the emission reduction
obligations for European countries under Kyoto. It quantifies emissions, sets a cap, and
establishes incentives to meet these caps in the cheapest way possible with punitive fines
enforced for those who exceed the emissions level that they hold allowances for. It includes 31
countries and covers more than 11,000 power installations (European Commission 2015).
Launching the market first included the free distribution of allowances to the then largest carbonemitting entities (Ibid.; Böhm, Misoczky and Moog 2012, 1620), but in subsequent phases the
allocation process includes the auctioning of these allowances among industries.
The adoption of emissions trading as the central policy instrument to address the climate issue by
the EU and at Kyoto was one among many alternative options that were available to
policymakers at that time. Other types of policy intervention to address the climate problem
could possibly have favored political measures to curb existing harmful practices, subsidized or
used existing technological research (Callon 2009, 535) to find feasible alternatives or require
the use of alternatives. Other alternative options included possible decisions to phase out national
and international subsidies supporting fossil fuel extraction, the placement of taxes on carbon
emissions and possibly asking for reparations from past over-polluters, or the allocation of
restricted amounts of non-tradable carbon emissions to each country as a first step. Otherwise
emission rights for polluters could be sold, but with revenues distributed to individuals or
communities (Lohmann 2005, 204-5).
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In contrast, carbon trading allows private businesses to trade in pollution permits and assume
self-regulatory roles in the market. However, this shift toward private governance mechanisms
does not suggest a straightforward move of power away from states and toward firms, but rather
an interdependence between public and private actors (Falkner 2003, 85). The associated
coexistence of public and private governance raises questions about authority and legitimacy
(Bernstein et al. 2010, 168). While states sometimes choose to delegate important tasks to private
actors, private actors sometimes proactively change the conditions on the ground, leaving states
consequently adapting or following through (Green 2014, 164). In the case of carbon markets,
states are in charge of setting the legal framework for the market, setting the emission caps and
distributing the permits among industries within their jurisdiction. But these decisions are
increasingly influenced and structured by the functioning of other entities, diffused among a
diverse set of actors, including fossil fuel and high-energy consuming corporations, registries for
accounting for carbon credits and for the exchange of allowances, intermediaries, verifiers and
many others involved in trading transactions. This interaction between the myriad of actors and
practices involved contributes to the blurring of boundaries between public and private
governance (Bernstein et al. 2010, 168), raising the following questions.
1.1

Research Questions

The first and main question that this research addresses is whether the adoption of market-based
mechanisms can be explained by an increasingly central role that private, non-state market
actors have come to play in decision-making processes.
The second research question asks about the interests of businesses and states in the adoption of
carbon markets as the primary policy instrument to address climate change. The underlying
interests would explain the reason that carbon markets are most favored by politicians and
corporations which provides further explanation for the adoption of this policy instrument and
the emergence of emissions trading as the primary tool to address climate change.
The third research question asks: how does private governance interact with state governance in
the carbon trading regulatory system? This question looks at the processes by which private,
non-state market actors participate in setting up and influence the design and standards of the
regulatory market, how these activities interact with state regulatory functions, and how they are
thereby gaining influence on policy design.
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1.2

Hypotheses

The main hypothesis is that states’ delegation of regulatory and monitoring functions to non-state
private market actors can be explained by the latter’s experience with and involvement in
market-based regulatory mechanisms allowing for its influence on state policy.
The second hypothesis is that these environmental actions and regulatory measures by non-state
market actors help realize private corporate interests in ways that do not necessarily reflect or
adequately address public environmental concerns.
The third hypothesis regards how private and state governance interact. The hypothesis is that
the state’s role becomes limited to the provision of the appropriate political framework and
conditions for private actors to establish processes for making profits.
1.3

Research Structure

The thesis is structured as follows. The remainder of this chapter first provides a background
discussion of environmental governance and the international environmental regime before
proceeding to the discussion in the Literature Review on the interpretations of the recent
developments in governance. Chapter 2 outlines the conceptual framework of the study,
introducing an approach based on Green IR theory. Chapter 3 looks into the role and interests of
non-state market actors in bringing about and/or designing this policy instrument. It provides
specific information on corporate influence in the example of BP’s involvement and participation
in setting up a national and an international emissions trading scheme. It thereby addresses the
first and main question, as well as answering the first part of the second research question about
corporate interests. Chapter 4 is a discussion that completes the answer to the second research
question on underlying corporate and state interests by discussing state interests, how they
aligned with corporate interests, and how the policy framework was institutionalized reflecting
this alignment of state and corporate interests. This provides further possible explanations for
why carbon markets have become the key instrument to address climate change. Chapter 5 looks
at the consequences of this alignment of state and corporate interests in light of the suggested
alternative critical insights provided by Green Theory. These include social and ecological
impacts of carbon markets and the diversion from environmental protection as a priority, as a
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result of market-dependent deregulatory conditions. Chapter 6 summarizes the conclusions and
suggests issues where future research might look into.

1.4

Global Environmental Governance and the International Environmental Regime

Policymaking concerning environmental protection as a well-established foreign policy issue is a
recent development in international politics; a century ago it was for states only an issue of
domestic politics. Calls for concern for the environment in the 1960s and 1970s, preceding the
first global environmental conference in 1972, were critical of overproduction and prevalent
over-consumptive lifestyles. The expectation was then to change the social and economic order
that gave rise to the crisis, and to redefine economic growth and other values that dominated and
shaped an unsustainable economic system. These newly articulated value-led expectations for
transformational change targeted the system of unregulated industrial growth set up for unlimited
production and free trade (Bernstein 2001, 2-3). The principles of open access and the free use of
resources were challenged by a philosophical shift toward perceiving the environment as ‘global
commons’ that are scarce, endangered and in need to be regarded with a doctrine of common
heritage, and treated with a new norm of planetary stewardship (Litfin 1993, 105-6).
More systematic interest in global environmental protection at the international level came in the
1970s when the environmental crisis started being discussed in United Nations fora (Falkner
2013, 251). The following decades have seen a rise in the numbers of negotiated international
environmental treaties, the actors involved in them, the issues they cover, and the norms and
principles that they embody (Litfin 1993, 103). This has given rise to the international
environmental regime. The most widely-accepted definition of regimes, formulated by Stephen
Krasner, sees a regime as a set of “implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decisionmaking procedures” (Krasner 1983, 1). Regimes can be tacit or implicit. They are distinct from
institutions in that they can be seen as the guiding principles of the social practices that
institutions embody. Institutions on the other hand, can be seen as manifestations of regimes
(Litfin 1993, 97). The following will look more closely into developments in the content of this
emerging regime.
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At the 1972 Stockholm Conference, concerns both for the environment and for economic
development were simultaneously articulated, with a primary emphasis on environmental
protection. Later, the Brundtland report was produced by the World Commission on
Environment and Development in 1987, gathering momentum for the new concept of
‘sustainable development.’ It laid out a Keynesian-like compromise, where the proposed
framework saw economic development necessarily tempered through some regulative
intervention that would protect from negative environmental externalities and which would
direct development toward a path that is less harmful to the environment (Bernstein 2001, 6-7)2.
However, since the 1970s and early 1980s, attempts at environmental regulation by the state
faced hostile opposition from the private sector. This is how industry’s engagement with climate
politics first appeared; in the form of collective action led by the Global Climate Coalition
(GCC), a group of large multinational corporations with carbon/energy-intensive manufacturing
operations, organizing transatlantic opposition to environmental regulation (Meckling 2011, 32).
Then, some businesses decided to pioneer a strategy where both environmental commitments are
met and market opportunities gained. There was an emerging trend of ‘corporate
environmentalism’ giving rise to a deliberative regulatory system that does not derive its
governing authority from state authority nor is it accountable to state authority (Bernstein and
Cashore 2007, 349). This form of environmental governance is distinctive in terms of the extent
and density of non-state actor involvement (Bernstein et al. 2010, 164).
This shift in governance practices was accompanied by another development, whereby in the 20
years following the first international environmental conference, environmental efforts were
reformed in the context of a liberal international economic order. It saw a shift in principles and
rules toward market-based solutions (Bernstein 2001). It is argued that the Rio Earth Summit
institutionalized this economic liberal approach to address environmental crises, where marketbased tools would result both in economic development and environmental protection (Ibid.;
Böhm, Misoczky and Moog 2012, 1618). The 1992 Rio Earth Summit adopted a new set of ideas

2

The significance of this report lies in its later becoming a foundational document for the 1992 Earth Summit which
later environmental protection to economic growth. It brought up ‘sustainable development’ on the international
agenda and proposed a five-fold increase in the gross world product attainable through the proposed environmental
protection (Litfin 1993, 108).
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which established compatibility between economic growth and environmental concerns, and
which linked the attainment of environmental protection goals with the pursuit of liberal
economic policies. The adoption of market-based mechanisms represented a governance policy
that differs substantially from what was earlier understood and expected from international
cooperation for the environment. This framework eventually guided global environmental
governance for subsequent years (Bernstein 2001, 2-3).
It is argued that emphasizing interstate negotiations and multilateral treaty-making in studying
global climate governance “masks the ongoing development of alternative governance
arrangements” (Ibid, 163). The emergent hybrid forms of governance between public and private
actors have come to leave room for self-regulation by industry (Newell 2011), but these parallel
regulatory functions by non-state market actors, despite their influence on state decision-making,
did not receive the deserved closer attention in studying global environmental politics.
Changes in public and private governance both in terms of the actors involved and the purposes
of governance practices (Bernstein et al. 2010, 172) is visible in a number of environmental
regimes, but is most visible in the climate regime. The development of governance arrangements
by non-state market actors is particularly evident in the ‘global carbon market’” (Ibid). Also,
carbon markets arguably represent the most significant case for market-based environmental
governance (Mecking 2011a, 26). The following paragraphs discuss this further.

1.4.1 The Climate Regime
Climate Change has been described as “the greatest market failure the world has ever seen”
(Stern 2006), and there has emerged a near consensus on the commodification of promises not to
emit and the rights to emit specified amounts (Bernstein et al. 2010, 163) for addressing
greenhouse gas-induced climate change. The establishment of markets for trading these
allowances and credits became the primary instrument to address climate change and gained
significant political momentum as the central pillar of climate policies (Voß 2007, 337; Meckling
2011b). The EU ETS, together with the adoption of emissions trading in international climate
governance negotiations, have given rise to a global emissions trading regime (Voß 2007, 337),
the main components of which are the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC), the Kyoto Protocol and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) (Steinar and Skodvin 2011). The “regime complex” for climate change is made up of
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fragmented institutional, narrowly focused, and loosely connected systems perceived as
providing a more effective policy arrangement, the emissions trading regime constituting one of
them (Victor and Keohane 2011, 17-8).
The Kyoto Protocol provides a major example of the marketization of climate policy. Adopted at
the UN Framework Convention for Climate Change (UNFCCC) session held in 1997 in Kyoto,
Japan, and ratified in 2001 by a number of industrialized countries (excluding the US), while
including legally binding commitments for a number of countries to lower emissions to 5%
below 1990 levels within the commitment period from 2008 to 2012 (IPCC 2007, 83), it
introduced the market-based ‘flexibility mechanisms’ to achieve them3. The ‘flexible’
mechanisms were suggested during the negotiations after stagnation and stand-off between
countries at negotiations. They were meant to establish trading systems for pollution permits and
allow for the investment in ‘clean’ overseas projects to count against emission reduction
obligations.
The ‘flexible mechanisms’ adopted at Kyoto include the Joint Implementation mechanism, a
scheme that allows investments in projects between countries that are committed to reduction
targets. An investing company in the UK, for example, could invest in a project in an Eastern
European country that has a reduction target, but where the project could be implemented with
lower costs, and generate the needed carbon credits to offset an extra amount of emissions from
its local operations (Bachram 2004, 8). Another important Kyoto mechanism is the Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM), which actively engages developing countries in global
emission reduction targets (Paulsson 2009, 64). This is how developing countries and countries
with no reduction targets more generally, like China and India, are participants in global carbon
trading. They are linked to the market through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)
(Meckling 2011, 26).

3

States with emission reduction commitments are mostly industrialized countries and countries with economies in
transition. Because of the ‘differentiated responsibilities’ principle adopted by the UNFCCC based on the fact that
the ‘largest share of historical and current emissions of greenhouse gases has originated in developed countries’, no
limits on emissions were placed on developing countries (Lohmann 2005, 204-5).
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The CDM emerged as the most important market-based mechanism adopted at Kyoto (Bernstein
et al. 2010, 164). It should serve to reduce the costs for achieving emission reduction targets for
Annex 1 countries which have reduction commitments, help non-Annex 1 countries achieve
sustainable development, and contribute to the transfer of technology to developing countries
(Paulsson 2009, 64; UNFCCC 2014). The CDM is considered to be the most hybrid form of
public-private partnerships (Bäckstrand 2008, 90), and also, as an offset market, one around
which much controversy has developed. The CDM is included in Article 12 of the Kyoto
Protocol and was referred to by the Chairman of the negotiations as the “Kyoto surprise”
(Werksman 1998). It was included at the very end of the negotiations, and was crucial to the
successful conclusion of a final agreement. The CDM is perceived as the “main channel for lowcarbon investment in developing countries” (Stern 2006, xxiv), which is believed to serve a
benevolent double-purpose of assisting developing countries with economic development
through its sustainable development projects, in addition to helping industrial countries to
achieve their emission reduction targets cost-efficiently (IPCC 2007, 78).

One view sees emissions trading as having been included in the Kyoto Protocol only because it
was conditional for the US to become part of the treaty (Meckling 2011, 29). While the US
promoted the use of emissions trading during the Kyoto negotiations (Bernstein et al. 2010, 164;
MacKenzie 2009, 443; Werksman 1998, 151-52), the EU had been skeptic of this policy
instrument. It initially opposed the suggested ‘flexibility’ mechanisms, seeing them as an
amelioration of commitments. Instead, it favored coordinated policies and measures (Wettestad
2005, 1), which are closer to what was implemented in Europe in the 1990s, where achieving
emission reduction targets was primarily done through direct regulation and taxation. However, a
proposed unanimous carbon tax across the EU faced strong opposition from industry and some
key member states, which constituted a barrier to this proposal (Spash 2010, 170)4. Most
accounts, however, commonly refer to heavy business lobbying during the negotiations at Kyoto
(Lohmann 2009, 13; Werksman 1998; Andresen and Agrawala 2002, 48; Böhm and Dabhi 2009)
to possibly explain why emissions trading has been adopted. Businesses favored flexible,
One interpretation of the later launch of the 2005 EU ETS sees the EU’s acceptance of trading schemes after its initial objection
to them as the filling by the EU of a power vacuum after US withdrawal from the international regulatory Kyoto framework and
after the European Commission failed to legislate its own proposed carbon tax (Spash 2010, 170; Wettestad 2005), as a last resort
remaining after this proposal was rejected (Baldwin 2008, 271).
4
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market-based programs over plans that set emission reduction targets, timetables, and possible
taxes and penalties. Practices and patterns constituting their involvement are what the following
paragraphs will turn to.
1.4.1.1 Private actors in the climate regime
The 1995 Sulphur dioxide trading scheme in the US was an important step in bringing about the
idea of a ‘global’ carbon market and for having the US delegation pushing for the adoption of
emissions trading during the international negotiations at Kyoto (Böhm, Misoczky and Moog
2012, 1620).When the cap-and-trade system with its market mechanism first appeared to be the
ideal solution in the US sulphur-dioxide emissions trading system (MacKenzie 2009, 442), this
involved, or came as a reaction to, active opposition from those who feared economic loss as a
result of regulation. The health-related and environmental hazards of sulphur dioxide had been
known for twenty years earlier, and in the 1980s there had been many attempts at Congress to
address the problem, especially with regard to coal-fired power stations. However, affected
businesses lobbied to prevent the bills from being passed. This is when the idea of a trading
scheme was first implemented in the US on a relatively small scale in the 1970s and 1980s,
before becoming mainstream in the 1990s (Böhm, Misoczky and Moog 2012, 1620).

Corporations also lobby states at the international level. They are involved in negotiations on
multilateral environmental agreements and participate in implementing them (Falkner 2003, 72).
In the case of carbon markets, fossil fuel companies have been successful in protecting their
interests through certain state policies (Newell and Paterson 1998, 679), and there are many
accounts of investors pushing for pricing carbon in negotiation processes paving the way for
agreements (Gilbert 2015). These were particularly visible in the Rio Earth Summit negotiations,
as well as in the run-up to the summit, whereby firms and organizations such as the International
Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and the Business Council on Sustainable Development (BCSD)
lobbied state delegates for environmental solutions in the form of partnerships between
corporations, environmentalists and international society. They promoted a concept of
sustainable development that does not compromise business interests but one that fits a marketoriented, self-regulatory framework (Falkner 2003, 82). This is especially significant when
regarded in connection with the fact that the adoption of carbon trade has coincided with a
change in business’ consensus from a united position in opposition to regulation in the form of
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mandatory controls and emission caps to the emergence of a “pro-trading” coalition which
supported and promoted regulation in the form of carbon trading as the central policy instrument.
Such organizations which participate and which are increasingly assuming a role in negotiations
for developing carbon markets include the International Emissions Trading Association with
representatives from banks, corporations, carbon-traders, think tanks, NGOs which cooperate
and coordinate with nation-state delegates (Bernstein et al. 2010, 162). Market actors particularly
involved in carbon market operations and trading include the largest polluting companies, most
prominently, fossil fuel companies and electricity producers, major energy corporations like BP,
Shell and DuPont; privately-run registries, carbon traders, including famous personalities like Al
Gore, as well as carbon consultants and verifiers like PriceWaterHouseCoopers and other
providers of carbon-trading-related services.
Since 1998, this industry started gaining experience with emissions trading. BP was the pioneer,
followed by Shell, creating and implementing internal trading schemes and extending them to
their overseas operations (Wettestad 2005, 10). The fact that they had experience with carbon
measuring since the mid-1990s facilitated later delegation of essential monitoring tasks to them
and to their partners (Green 2014, 104). The way emissions have come to have monetary costs
(MacKenzie 2009, 442), and the way carbon and other greenhouse gas emissions have been
made tradable is a process whereby different gases are made commensurable, and whereby
accountants develop a standard treatment of emission rights (Ibid, 440). These activities are
carried out by non-state actors and authorized by market actors involved in trading. Particularly
offset markets rely on private actors to determine the standards for ensuring the credibility of
offset credits in terms of reflecting real and actual emission reductions.
These private registries and standard-setting entities dictate what emissions are reported and
how, in addition to tracking and accounting the holding and exchange of credits and offsets
(Bernstein et al. 2010, 168). These follow different standards for examining the integrity of
projects and offset credit credibility (Ibid, 167). Through these processes, private actors in
voluntary markets are increasingly participating in setting the rules for state-regulated carbon
markets. These activities grow increasingly independent from the state-led climate regime.
Through developing the standards and settings for the market they operate, it is not just the
standards of private organizations that become dominant, but also the values they embody
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(Bernstein et al. 2010, 168-9), which carry these actors’ own principles, rules and procedures
(Okereke, Bulkeley and Schroeder 2009, 58).
However, in addition to those market actors directly involved with carbon trading, many other
different actors are involved, constituting what Callon refers to as an interactive collective
network- dispersed in space and time, but explicitly referring to and borrowing from each other
(2009). These actors which participated in the establishment of carbon markets include scientists
working in the IPCC, the UNFCCC, national governments and international institutions and
organizations, like the OECD, which began to heavily promote emissions trading in the 1990s
(Bernstein et al. 2010, 164; Voß and Simons 2014, 736, 744-5). A circulating network of
specialists transferred expertise and know-how to different sites in a continuous process of
‘experimentation’ (Callon 2009, 538-9). The adoption and success of a number of market-based
emission trading schemes in the US provided a growingly popular model discussed and explored
for implementation in other parts of the world. So, at the time in which the EU maintained a
normative objection to Kyoto’s market proposals, European policy development centers were
already becoming part of the global network that studies, disseminates information, innovates
and connects experts and ideas on policy and economic opportunities inherent in emissions
trading. Its possibilities and opportunities were studied, innovations and modifications were
made and the idea of emissions trading instead of command-and-control regulation soon became
an acceptable idea in European policy circles with large parts of policy networks becoming
supportive of the instrument (Voß 2007, 337). This led to the later creation of the largest and
most successful emissions trading model. The following literature review will look at the
approaches through which these developments and practices were interpreted and the debates
they engaged and gave rise to.
1.5

Literature Review

Principles for environmental self-regulation, widely adopted at the international level, and rising
through private actors individually and voluntarily taking part in environmental standard-setting,
served to show that corporations can agree to a set of principles and guidelines that they would
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voluntarily incorporate into their managerial activities5 (Falkner 2003, 82). This provided ground
for a paradigm which sees environmental sustainability most favorably attainable through
voluntary market-based industrial strategies. Newell and Paterson have argued for the potential
to achieve sustainable development and a greener global economy without radically
compromising the capitalist system of economic growth and accumulation. They suggest a form
of ‘climate capitalism’ that should come about through industry-led market initiatives (2010).
Bernstein coins the term “liberal environmentalism” to explain the emergence and
institutionalization of this trend comprised of a set of norms which links environmental
protection with liberal economic principles at the international institutional level. This norm
complex posits that the attainment of an environmentally-sustainable system can be achieved
through an economic growth model based on liberal economic principles (2001). His explanation
for this development rests on a sociological-institutional approach which views the adoption of
certain norms as a socio-evolutionary process based on their compatibility with already
institutionalized norms. Thereby, the change toward ‘liberal environmentalism’ is explained by
the fact that international institutions were already dominated by liberal norms and were
receptive of environmentalism pinned in a liberal economic framework. This form of
environmental protection coupled with economic growth was thereby institutionalized in line
with the wider dominant framework. This institutionalized environmentalism did not in fact
reach the international agenda, Bernstein highlights, except in this liberal, economic-growth
related form (Ibid).
Another account sees this as a broader development toward a financialization of global climate
change policy (Layfield 2013; Lohmann 2011, 93), which is part of a trend in which
governments address a global problem through allowing newly-created financial markets for
trading in financial products to be the important means to address it. Here, the issue is not just
the reliance on a market instrument to attain a set target, but rather a broader development, part
of a finance led growth process, where the priority is given to establishing a market and

5

The primary example being that of ISO in that it provided global standards for environmental management systems
for industries and companies, becoming the main global reference point for the development of environmental selfregulatory management systems and granting certifications according to these standards (Falkner 2003, 73).
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developing its financial trading schemes and not, as is argued for in the case with carbon
markets, to the real and effective reduction in emissions (Layfield 2013, 902).
Other interpretations point to the knowledge-related influence that private, non-state market
actors can exert on state delegates to push for the adoption of certain agreements. Irja Vormedal
shows how in the negotiations of the market-based flexible mechanisms at Kyoto, business
representatives influenced the knowledge of state delegates. She explains how business
representatives had formed formal and informal networks with state delegates in attempts to
influence the outcome of negotiations (2008, 47-8). In some cases, it was done through very
technical presentations and expert advice which exert influential power on state delegates not in
possession of equal technological proficiency. She uses a behavioral approach to power,
capturing the explicit forms of influence and uses the concept of ‘corporate technological power’
for explaining how the knowledge of state delegates were shaped in certain ways that were likely
to affect the outcome in what is in the business representatives’ interests (Ibid, 47-8).
The efforts at influencing state decisions points to the critical role that states play in bringing
about the desired arrangements. Markus Lederer highlights that carbon markets could not have
existed without institutional support from states. None of the non-state actors involved does
already have the capacity to set-up or regulate the market (2012a, 524). Although the
interconnectedness of state and non-state actors is visible, it is still through states and state-like
regulatory institutions like the EU Commission or the CDM’s executive board that policymaking decisions are formulated and regulatory instruments first selected (Ibid, 537).
However, the focus on the development of carbon markets as on-going collective experiments
shows how the issue is gradually becoming less a function of state action and increasingly a
function of cooperation between public and private actors in institutional and other platforms,
forming the policy outcome. From one viewpoint, this process, whereby the constant rise of
problems in need to be addressed restructures systemic regulatory functions and rules,
contributes to the redefinition of the scopes that should be dealt with by the political, the
economic and the scientific (Callon 2009, 545). The construction of carbon markets at later
stages and the market’s evolution would thereby become a function of practices by the actors
engaged and is constantly reconfigured through activities in the commodification and trading
processes (Lederer 2012b, 652).
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This brings up the concept of governance, which in important ways captures the social and
political underpinnings of self-regulation by private actors and its interaction with state
regulation. Governance is understood as the making of rules by a myriad of processes not falling
within the authority of one body that can impose them (Rosenau and Czempiel 1992). With its
inclusion of transnational actors and transnational rule-making the concept connects
environmental politics with global politics (Paterson, Humphreys and Pettiford 2003, 1). The
term governance has, however, in the past few years been used in reference to many political
structure or process formed beyond the state including a wide array of different contents, scopes
and contexts (Dingwerth and Pattberg 2006, 185). This has resulted in a term with too much
flexibility to it use, which affected its capacity to structure and order our observations (Ibid.
187).
Dingwerth and Pattberg distinguish between governance as an analytical concept to refer to
observable phenomena in world politics, and governance as a political program. Whereas the
former includes observations on the systems of rule ‘at all levels’ and the shift from international
relations toward transnational politics (2006, 190), the latter deals with the more specific
questions on issues of authority, legitimacy, the interaction between state and transnational actors
and the implications of these changes.
This deals more directly with processes of global economic integration and its consequences
with regard to the state’s sphere of regulation over private transnational activities (Haufler 2001).
Private governance at the global level refers to interactions among private actors, or between
private actors and state and other non-state actors which result in the structuring or directing of
arrangements for actors’ conduct (Falkner 2003, 72). At the international level, this includes how
inter-state negotiations are increasingly influenced by transnational governance systems
(Bernstein et al. 2010). For the case of carbon markets, Bernstein el al. analyze this interaction
between transnational governance systems and inter-state negotiations, showing how
transnational governance and organizing links between carbon markets are likely to influence the
direction and effectiveness of any future multilateral treaty-making.
This influence can be summarized as follows. Instead of a vertical path for policy development
starting from multilateral, legally-binding negotiations, translating down to national and
subnational regulations, the independent development of carbon markets by non-state market
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actors turns this vertical path toward a structure where states would be responding to, integrating
or regulating existing practices carried out in already functioning markets (Ibid.). Private actors
interact with states or with other non-state actors resulting in certain institutional arrangements
that condition actors’ conduct, with an effect resembling governance by states. This is why the
notion of ‘authority’ has been ascribed to private actors (Falkner 2003, 73), which is typically
approached from a critical perspective.
This critical perspective on governance is primarily concerned with issues of power. One point
that distinguishes it from power understood in the traditional sense in realist or institutionalist
accounts is that it deals with power as multiple as well as relational (Okereke, Bulkeley and
Schroeder 2007, 72). It can be formed through social relations that can be a function of the
alignment of social structures, including the practices and mechanisms through which political
actors realize their goals (Ibid.). This research will look at the alignment of interests specifically
of state actors and private market-oriented corporate actors in devising one policy instrument. It
engages this critical perspective by looking into who gets what, how and when.
Dauvergne and Lister analyze the increasingly powerful role that commodity chains are playing
in IR. They look at how environmental governance is increasingly moving into the corporate
sphere, and how the processes involved intersect with states’ multilateral negotiation and
regulation efforts (2010, 145). Organizations such as the Business for Sustainable Development
are used in attempts to display these actors’ environmental credentials, which are in effect
promoting the neoliberal innovative governance mechanisms (Paterson, Humphreys and
Pettiford 2003, 2). Observers from a critical perspective point to the rising dominance of
neoliberal forms of globalization and the increased centralization of governance power in the
hands of a mix of private and public actors, most notably TNCs, but also including the World
Bank, the WTO and the World Economic Forum. The governance mechanisms they help
institutionalize contribute to the marketization of governance as is the case with emissions
trading (Ibid; Paterson 2010), or the marketization of global environmental politics as in
practices of privatization and commodification of natural resources based on the belief that the
market will deliver environmental protection in the most effective way (Newell 2008a). Their
efforts are perceived as helping create a system for the capture and pricing of ecosystems and
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environmental goods ((Böhm, Misoczky and Moog 2012). This perspective will guide the rest of
the study. Its theoretical background is provided in detail in the next chapter.
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2

Conceptual Framework

This chapter will first provide the framework guiding the market approach to environmental
regulation before proceeding to laying out the critical framework to be applied to this research.
2.1

The Market Approach

Business’ interpretation of sustainable development is based on the belief that markets have the
capacity for self-regulation if left to their own mechanisms. External state intervention would
only be needed in exceptional circumstances (Falkner 2003, 82). Although the setting of a carbon
price will not stop the use of fossil fuels, it is said to pave the way for the shift in energy use
(Lohmann 2011, 96). The idea behind ‘commoditizing’ environmental resources is to make the
environment a scarce and ‘priced’ resource through establishing limits on its use and allocating
property-like instruments for its users. According to this view, the environment previously had a
price of ‘zero’ and this therefore allowed overconsumption. Trading on the newly created
property, in the form of allowances and offset permits, allows the value that society places on the
environment to be reflected in its price (Sandor, Bettelheim and Swingland 2003).
Also, when certain, well-defined property is distributed to users, they will manage it most
efficiently. The financial reward they would receive from selling their property would provide
the motivation to the owners of permits to reduce their emissions and save their permits to sell
them later on in the market (Ibid, 57). Corporations would take consumer preferences into
account, and the value that consumers place on environmental protection would signal the
appropriate demand for incorporating environmental concerns into corporate activities. This
price mechanism would in the process determine the optimal level for corporate investments in
reducing the pollution their operations produce (Falkner 2003, 82).
2.1.1 Intellectual Roots
The idea of a cap-and-trade scheme was developed in its full-fledged form by the economist
John Harkness Dales (1968), but its intellectual roots are commonly traced to a famous work of
Nobel Prize Laureate Ronald Coase (1960), The Problem of Social Cost. This is when he first
advocated for the approach of using price mechanisms and market instruments for the efficient
management of negative market externalities. He sought to replace the common belief that
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internalizing externalities should be done through regulation, taxation, or placing liability on
firms, corresponding to the damage they created, since restraining a business would inflict harm
on it (Coase 1960, 837).
Instead, his approach is based on the belief that through the market, an optimal arrangement of
rights and their value will be allocated (Ibid, 851). The aim would not be to cut pollution
altogether, thereby causing a reduction in production, but to arrive at an optimal amount of
pollution, the one which would maximize the value of production (Ibid, 875). He suggests that
the right for firms and businesses to carry out physical actions, including polluting, producing
smoke, noise and environmental harms, should be considered ‘a factor of production’, which is
to have a cost that reflects the loss it is incurring on others (Ibid, 876). Firms would gain from
reducing the cost they pay for their factors of production, and they would therefore be motivated
to reduce the negative externalities they are producing. Moreover, in conditions of perfect
information, zero market transaction costs, and rational utility maximizing agents, making this
factor of production tradeable would ensure that it lands in the hands of those who can use it
most efficiently (Lohmann 2005, 206).
2.1.2 Pricing Carbon
Carbon trade is therefore perceived as the one policy option that ensures the achievement of the
desired environmental outcome with low costs. It is typically defended using a neoliberal
rhetoric. ‘Set a global market price and the market will sort it out’ is a common example
(Lohmann 2009b, 25). As an instrument for “saving costs,” it helps make society “move along
the least-cost pollution-reduction supply curve” (Sandor, Bettelheim and Swingland 2003, 5758). It serves to prevent the potential ‘negative’ economic impacts of setting carbon constraints
(Mehling 2012, 277), and aims to take advantage of low-cost opportunities for cutting emissions
by rewarding those emitters who would incur the least costs for emission mitigation to exploit
their competitive advantage most profitably. These would sell their permits to others who still
find it more expensive to switch their operations to cleaner technologies than to buy these
permits (Ibid.). At the international level, a global carbon price would lead to utmost economic
efficiency because emission cuts would take place wherever they are the cheapest (Stern 2006,
xviii). The efficiency/inefficiency dualism thereby makes up the main support for carbon
markets (Lohmann 2009b, 25).
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The Kyoto solution is based on the belief that environmental goods should be privately owned,
and assigned a price in the market, especially in the absence of centralized, strict government
control. In contrast, holders of private legal ownership rights to an environmental good would
manage it best and with least coercion (Lohmann 2005, 206). According to this view, there are
no real losers in the distribution and trading in pollution permits, but permits and allowances will
be received by parties that will maximize the value of their emission-causing operations
(Baldwin 2008, 270). The pricing of carbon should also provide the incentives to invest in new
technologies (Stern 2006, xix). The market allows autonomous economic agents to initiate
innovative solutions. It allows adjustments, compromises and alternatives if these solutions are
not the most effective, which might not be the case in other regulatory systems. In such ways, it
is a tool for coordination of policy in between economic agents (Callon 2009, 535-6).
According to the market-based approach, the role of the state is to ensure carbon scarcity in the
market, in addition to being prepared to place price ceilings on carbon permits to prevent
possible future disruptions to industries for which it is too difficult or too costly to switch to
alternatives (Lohmann 2011, 97). At the international level, states should smooth out crossnational barriers to trade and pave the way to exchanges in a world market. The emphasis in this
approach is not on states, and their political concerns, but on the individual, the firm and the
entrepreneur (Gilpin 2015, 231).
In fact, some supporters for this approach argue that private actors have been actively involved in
structurally influencing transnational economic relations in history, and that what we’re seeing
now is only a re-emergence of private actors taking up governance functions (Falkner 2003, 73).
It is specific to the 20th century that these functions have been associated primarily with states
and public institutions, as a function of the expansion of the state’s regulatory role domestically,
and then internationally. The current re-emergence is occurring under conditions of economic
globalization and a re-structuring of state functions similar to the ones in the 19th century (Ibid).
From a liberal point of view, state-market relations are inherently harmonious and can be a
“positive-sum game”, where both gain in a proper ordering of relations. Efficiency, according to
this view, is a cosmopolitan interest that also serves national interests, even if unequally between
nations, and there is no contradiction between this economic cosmopolitan interest and the
political national one. Economic activity can realize the optimum state of an efficient use of
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scarce resources and thereby maximize world welfare. The ideal conditions for achieving this
involve a free market, with no state interference in economic transactions but with a removal of
restrictions on the international flow of investments (Gilpin 2015, 230).
2.2

An Alternative Framework for Environmental Issues: Introducing Green Theory

The most common framework to study environmental issues has been the international regime
approach. Since its emergence in the 1970s, the study of international environmental cooperation
as a sub-field of IR has been concerned with international environmental cooperation, and has
primarily been carried out through regime analyses from a neoliberal framework. Through this
framework, the environment was treated merely as a sub-issue of IR or another political problem
requiring state cooperation (Eckersley 2010, 258).
Using this approach, policy is explained as a function of interstate bargaining and the influence
of international institutions on state behavior. It assumes that states and markets are two separate
spheres of human activity (Newell and Paterson 1998, 670). It sees state-based institutions as
central for organizing collective environmental action since states and international institutions
have proved resilient to economic globalizing forces and ecological interdependence. In addition,
the global effects of the environmental crisis are making state intervention in the global economy
increasingly necessary. Therefore, when states’ interests align for addressing environmental
threats, the issue is to find the right conditions for cooperation and institution-building (Falkner
2013, 252).
However, this institutional approach arguably precludes a critical analysis of environmental
issues, and the need to reconsider the theoretical frameworks for approaching environmental
issues (Hovden 1999, 50). Green IR theory challenges state-centric analyses from traditional IR
schools and their tendency to treat the environment as another issue area. It views the
environmental crisis as a theoretical challenge on its own (Eckersley 2010, 258). Green IR
theory, which emerged in the last decades of the twentieth century, is critical of the discipline’s
ecological blindness (Ibid.). It questions the underlying values of IR, (along with its units of
analysis and rationalist frameworks). The environmental issue, viewed as a theoretical challenge,
rather needs new approaches and concepts (Sørensen and Jackson 1999, 250; Eckersley 2010,
258). This research will therefore incorporate green theory to provide a green critical perspective
on the neoliberal approach to the climate issue.
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Green theory is located close to the critical theory of the Frankfurt school and feminism in that it
is oriented toward a normative emancipatory goal. It attempts to integrate normative concerns
and explanatory processes. It shares with critical theory, feminism, and poststructuralism the
rejection of clear-cut fact/value distinctions (Paterson 2001, 298-9). It contrasts with poststructuralism in that it does make some foundational claims (Ibid., 299). It contrasts with a
governmentality approach, which would understand governance as top-down monitoring- at
global scale. If one was to approach carbon markets from a governmentality perspective, the
focus would be on the practices and “measurement protocols that include the environment in
routine everyday calculations” (Al Gore quoted in Lohmann 2009a, 499). The concern here,
however, is with decentralized, flexible, and a market-based mode of governance that leaves it to
market forces and dynamics to determine the outcome.
The central object of enquiry in Green theory is how human societies harm eco-systems and
species. Some of the bases on which Green Political Theory rests are eco-centrism and a ‘limits
to growth’ argument. The first is a rejection to anthropocentrism, which views humans as the
center of nature and as the only holders of moral value in the natural world. It instead places an
independent value on eco-systems and other living species. Practices that do not place the
environment at the forefront would be deplored both because of an independent ethical value
seen in species and eco-systems, and also due to their effects on human welfare and survival
(Paterson 2001, 298) which are necessarily linked to a well-preserved biosphere. Green theory in
IR is therefore concerned with how political structures and processes contribute to this
destruction. The purpose of that enquiry is essentially normative (Ibid.).
The second, the ‘limits to growth argument’, is most relevant to IR, and relates to the current
environmental crisis. This argument says that it is the belief in unlimited economic growth and
the pursuit of unlimited accumulation which are at the root cause of the environmental crisis. It is
a more particular understanding of the crisis that refers to the exponential economic growth
processes experienced in the last two centuries (Ibid, 278-9). It is connected with a proposed
structural change in the political organization that governs how human societies transform their
natural environment, and a reorganization of the structure of political institutions that integrate
economic production, distribution and exchange in political life. It is meant to critically revise
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and extend “neo-Marxist inspired International Political Economy and normative IR theories”
with a cosmopolitan orientation (Eckersley 2010, 258). The following will show how.
2.2.1 International Political Economy Perspective
This research focuses on the role that companies play in influencing state policies. It sees policy
and instrument choice, design and implementation as necessarily associated with issues of power
(Spash 2010, 170). Two decades ago, Susan Strange argued that the center of gravity in world
politics has moved from public agencies to private entities and from states to markets and their
market operators (Strange 1996, 95). She has called for the placement of the study of
international business at the center of International Relations analyses rather than at the
periphery (Strange 1991, 245). The reason IR scholarship has focused on states is its concern
with power understood as the ability to create or destroy order, not in terms of power understood
as wealth (Ibid.), which has the ability to influence social and political processes.
The basic rationale in political economy, however, is that power and wealth are ultimately joined
(Gilpin 2015, 228). This power is derived from the power of international capital to create or
destroy wealth and from the ability to influence elements of freedom and justice (Strange 1991,
245). In this context, the state is important as a political framework, but loses its power over
economic processes, which from a political economy perspective rather encourages economic
dependence not interdependence in economic globalization processes, with an associated loss of
power (Sørensen and Jackson 1999). In such conditions, the state’s role is to condition the ways
in which societies are linked with the global political economy (Cox 1996b, 154). This is how
they themselves become agents of globalizing trends (Ibid., 155).
In addition, this research will approach the important position of finance in governing carbon
markets as harmonious with the increased importance that international finance has gained in the
international economy in the past 30 years (Frankel 2015, 256). Strange makes the distinction
between a ‘real economy’ based on the exchange of goods and production, and a symbolic
economy based on finance enabling the creation of credit and processes for gaining further
access to credit (Cox 1996c, 179). These conditions enable both transnational corporations and
banks to exploit the opportunities available in a deregulated market, and expect the support of
states when they face difficulties (Cox 1996b, 155). Strange sees these processes as engendering
economic and social polarization between the winners and losers in the globalization of finance
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and production (Cox 1996c, 185). In a globalized economy, the maximization of market shares is
the dominant practice (Strange 2002). In the case of carbon markets, as firms seek to maximize
their carbon credits, they will become more expensive in the market, and thus scarcer. However,
this also means that they will land in the hands of the richest polluters, with limited access for the
businesses which find it more expensive to switch to cleaner technologies.
An underlying neoliberal approach is based on the view that incentives should be incorporated
into regime structures to induce actors to take action. It does so with a problem-solving mentality
which considers the alternative modes of action based on a (preferably calculated) cost-benefit
analysis. Thereby, ‘solutions’ that work are favored over suggestions for seriously addressing the
underlying issues, structural causes and injustices. For addressing the climate challenge, the
argument is that a shift away from fossil fuel use needs an expensive shift to new energy
production and use, which could harm the competitiveness of economies (Victor 2015, 427).
Foreign trade and investment are hereby the primary yardstick to evaluate social and economic
policies (Rodrik 2005, 365). Instead of policies that might negatively affect the latter, there is
consensus on an imperative for global economic integration, and for openness to trade and
investment, which are perceived as the driver for countries’ economic growth (Ibid.).
Therefrom, the shift toward private governance is seen as a manifestation of one certain
paradigm. This paradigm is legitimized and promoted by elites from corporations and banks,
states and academia, which prefer market mechanisms to a regulatory system (Falkner 2003, 83).
This approach explains the delegation of governance functions to private actors. Although it is
subject to constant power contestations among its players, and is based on a certain configuration
of power, these processes can be seen as occurring within a global hegemonic framework that
legitimizes them (Ibid.). This will lead to the eco-Marxist approach to the issue.
2.2.2 Eco-Marxist Perspective
A Marxist view looks at the distributive effects of economic relations. Its preoccupation with
political economy is concerned with revealing the conflictual relations which liberal thought has
termed harmonious, which are ways in which one party’s economic gain becomes another’s loss
(Gilpin 2015, 230). In a Marxist analysis, the basic actors are economic classes. In this case, the
actors are major corporations, states and communities whose economic activity within the
emerging market leads to a redistribution of wealth (Ibid.).The economic relations between them
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shape political structure, and therefore political outcomes can be explained as a dialectical
process between market forces and resistant sociopolitical systems (Ibid., 231). Engels
particularly highlighted that when political and economic structures contradict, the political
adapts to the demands of economic development (Ibid., 232).
This brings us to the role of the state in promoting capital accumulation (Newell and Paterson
1998, 679). States serve to create the conditions for “systematized market-exchange” that make
possible the neoliberal ‘commodification of nature’ (Lohmann 2012, 1, 5-6). Choosing carbon
markets as the main coordinating mechanism for dealing with carbon emissions was undeniably
a quantification-heavy choice (Lohmann 2005, 204). It can be seen as part of the neo-liberal
attempt to simulate efficient market analysis through cost-benefit policy-making (Lohmann
2009b, 25), replacing a more ecology-oriented view that looks at the relationship between
economic activity, consumption and environmental protection and sustainability more
holistically (Falkner 2003, 81). In this view, climate change is an inherent consequence of
capitalism (Cabello 2009, 192) as the latter does not have a built-in mechanism for abating
negative externalities (Callon 2009, 535-6). The ability to influence state policies toward marketbased regulation of market externalities would be explained by the structural power of capital.
From this angle, choosing carbon markets as the main coordinating mechanism for dealing with
carbon emissions also entrenches the inclusion of market mechanisms and norms into spheres of
life previously protected from markets. This is particularly the case with the spread of carbon
accounting techniques necessarily incorporated in carbon trading mechanisms (Lohmann 2009a,
499). This spread of ‘market-like’ calculations into ‘non-market’ spheres (Ibid.) is in line with
the neoclassical project attempting to cost environmental goods in monetary terms, whereby this
commodification then becomes an instance of market expansion (O’Neill 2007, 21-22).
For “Eco-Marxists”, carbon markets provide an example of this with the model for
commodification adopted at the Kyoto Protocol’s carbon market, the EU ETS, and earlier in the
US Acid Rain program for trading Sulphur dioxide emissions. They are based on creating a
commodity for the enclosure and commodification of pollution sinks. States would define the
units of this commodity as limits to the amount of molecules that can be emitted which helps in
making them quantifiable and measureable. In addition, molecules, molecule motion, or sinks
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that absorb molecules can, in principle, be laid claim to, and so they can be assigned tradable
property rights. These processes involving attempts to privatize natural resources and sites pave
the way for shifts in power and authority toward those involved and experienced with these
mechanisms (Lohmann 2009b, 25).
These market-favoring mechanisms preclude policies that address or incorporate the viewpoints
on capitalism’s inherent tendency to deplete natural resources and its incapacity to deal with
negative externalities or to incorporate them into its value chains of production and economic
exchange (Böhm, Misoczky and Moog 2012, 1619). They also reinforce the view that the current
form of economic activity is reconcilable with environmental sustainability, contrary to the
ecological view that the current state of production and consumption is the cause for the
environmental crisis. The current arrangement promotes a managerial perspective on
environmental issues that rather operationalizes a corporate view on state-market relations
(Falkner 2003, 82), with its orientation toward profits, calculated solutions, and market-related
benefits.
Furthermore, the adoption of this rule, specifically in the form of markets for ‘offset’ projects
generating carbon credits, possibly deepens an economic structure that actually encourages a
global division of labor. Countries with cheaper resources primarily take up the role of providing
investment sites, whereas transnational corporations act both as investors and earners of the right
to continue using fossil fuels. It moves further away from ecological justice, whereby past
polluters will stop profiting from pollution, and instead encourages past polluters to use the need
for economic development by less developed countries in maintaining their competitive position
by continuing to use cheap fossil fuels and making profits from other ‘clean’ investments.
Therefore, dividing the rights to pollute based on a political, country-based division does
possibly contribute to entrenching injustices. Transnational corporations can now move their
polluting operations to developing countries with no emission restrictions where they can operate
cheaply in non-regulated settings6. Their operations are constructed as helping leastdevelopment countries toward sustainable development and economic growth. As famous
6

This contrasts with a division based on economic class/category which, for this case for example, would mean a
division between transnational corporations who polluted in the past and others which have not profited from past
pollution. However, this only addresses the issue of aggravating existing injustices, but does not contribute to the
desired cut in emissions.
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advocate for carbon markets, Sir Nicholas Stern, put it, these are “opportunities to […] pilot new
approaches to creating large-scale flows for investment in low-carbon development paths” (Stern
2006, xxix), making them seem like a benevolent strategy for assisting these countries.
Essentially, green theory does not follow a positivist methodology, since positivism is associated
with the treatment of nature as objects (Paterson 2001, 298). But, as Cox states, sensitivity to
experienced reality is the primary ingredient for an academic field of enquiry to emerge (Cox
1996c, 176). The next three chapters will therefore outline the experienced reality of carbon
trading in terms of how it emerged, the interests involved, and how these interests serve to
entrench ecologically unsustainable and socially unjust practices in order to meet economic
interests. Together these three chapters will support the Green IR perspective outlined above.

29

3

The Analysis of Business Influence

BP tells governments that it encourages them to set a clear, stable and effective policy if
businesses were to cut emissions, “while providing energy competitively” (BP 2014). It was
firms which had moved to implement internal trading schemes, like BP, Shell and DuPont,
which first supported carbon trade as state policy, along with firms that were in a better position
than their competitors to adapt to this regulatory policy. These firms gained first-mover market
advantage upon establishing the new markets (Vormedal 2010), and instead of facing radical or
sudden regulation, they benefitted from a clear and predictable climate policy. Also, having
carbon priced facilitates firms’ internal business and investment strategy. It can be part of a risk
management strategy for valuing the costs that firms could incur and allows them to assess their
cost-savings and market opportunities from potential carbon investments (Kossoy et al. 2015,
14).
This chapter will first look into the business interests involved in carbon trading. It will discuss
the market opportunities that are sought, and the interests inherent in processes of
commensuration, commodification and trading of greenhouse gas emissions. It will then move to
trace the extent to which one major carbon market player, BP, has influenced the setting up of
emissions trading as a national policy, in the form of the UK Emissions Trading Scheme, and
later participated in the design of an international carbon market, the EU Emissions Trading
Scheme.
3.1

Business Interests

British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, while praising the emissions trading system established in
Europe and by the Kyoto Protocol said, “Carbon now has a price. Carbon saving is now a way of
making money. And […] businesses across the continent have an unprecedented opportunity to
benefit from carbon reduction”. The last decade of the twentieth century has seen a convergence
of environmental protection and financial markets. These take the form of greater
interdependence between a corporation’s financial performance and environmental protection
(Sandor, Bettelheim and Swingland 2003, 56). New forms of accumulation are created through
this internalization of this externality (Lohmann 2011, 96). The ‘offset’ markets, in particular,
have opened up opportunities for intermediation and speculation (Lohmann 2011, 97).
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A profitable business has emerged, where some organizations serve as intermediaries, selling
‘offsets’ to individuals and large corporations, so that the latter can become ‘carbon-neutral’
without changing their operations or practices. This allows some firms opportunities for largescale accumulation from carbon finance (Lohmann 2012, 6), while simultaneously serving the
need for finding new investment outlets for surplus capital at times of declining profits
(Lohmann 2011, 93). The banking of unused carbon credits is another option. The newlycreated carbon products on the financial market are targeted by banks and shadow banks for
investment, securitization, hedging, bundling or speculation (Ibid, 97). Traders and bankers
thereby continually set up new carbon exchange platforms for these opportunities (Lohmann
2005, 205) and mobilize other firms to invest in the emerging financial market (Deschenau and
Paterson 2010).
The results are that a ‘carbon consultancy’ business, for example, can invest in clean or
sustainable projects in developing countries and generate carbon credits therefrom, which it sells
to corporations that wish to offset their emissions (ClimateCare 2011). As a consequence, major
car manufacturers can label their operations and the products they produce ‘carbon-neutral’ as a
result of paying for an amount of carbon credits equivalent to how much carbon they emit
(ClimateCare 2011). This label only enhances their market position and does not reflect a real
shift in environmentally-harmful materials, operations or projects. Another result is the rise of
exchange platforms that use the environmental crisis to attract finance. The desire for taking
action to address the environmental crisis is mobilized toward the use of financial services. One
advertisement for an exchange platform for carbon trading, for example, rhetorically uses the
urgency to address climate change to prompt its audience to settle their carbon credit trading
transactions through its exchange services (Deschenau and Paterson 2010). This involves a
process of borrowing from, combining and ‘simulating’ practices from financial trading and into
markets for trading carbon derivatives (Ibid., 665-66).
Moreover, when carbon permits become an asset, fossil-fuel dependent industries attempt to
secure maximum free allocations distributed by governments (Lohmann 2011, 96). In addition to
the commodification involved, carbon markets serve to make commensuration possible.
Commensuration is the process by which different forms of carbon and gas emissions are made
into equal units and treated as equivalent. This process is not only technical, but has economic
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and political implications. It treats all greenhouse gases as equivalent to carbon. This results in a
wider range of projects involving different environmental hazards from different greenhouse
gases to become profitable in various carbon offset markets (Lederer 2012, 649). The
commensurability of gases is central to how the two main carbon markets, the EU Emissions
Trading Scheme and the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism, link. The World
Bank, BP, and other actors actively promote this linkage between systems and promote the
inclusion and tradability of different greenhouse gases to be exchanged with carbon credits
(Kossoy et al. 2015).
Advocates for carbon trading regard efforts by international financial institutions, like the World
Bank’s establishment of a Clean Energy Investment Framework, and initiatives by other
multilateral development banks, as having an important role to play in building trust and “scaling
up [carbon] investment flows” (Stern 2006, xxiv). “In order to influence behavior and investment
decisions, investors and consumers must believe that the carbon price will be maintained into the
future” (Stern 2006, xix). It helps set up their risk management systems (Kossoy et al 2015, 14),
and this predictability on the future existence and robustness of markets ensures their existing
market shares and their future investments will not lose their value. Securing these interests is
vital and suggests why some corporations took early action to promote the establishment of
emissions trading markets instead of other forms of regulation. The following paragraph will
look closer into this role.
3.2

BP’s Role and Involvement

The following case study analysis addresses the question of whether corporate actors are the
main mobilizing actors behind the current central policy to address climate change. It examines
the role of one oil giant, BP, which has been involved in emissions trading prior to the adoption
of this policy, having developed its own internal emissions trading system for its overseas
operations, before the UK and the EU emissions trading schemes were developed. Some have
argued that BP is the real designer of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (Corporate Europe
Observatory and Platform 2009b) through providing an international market-based trading
model, and through an involvement that was in some cases explained by the company’s desire to
prevent costly regulations, its anticipation of inevitable climate-related policy action, and its
intention to proactively participate in the policy outcome that would influence the regulatory
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environment in which it operates. By providing an internal emissions trading model, it would
gain first-mover advantage both at the regulatory platform and in the market. This chapter will
examine the extent to which this argument is true by looking closer into the process by which BP
has gained influence in designing the UK emissions trading scheme, and how much it influenced
the design of the EU ETS. It looks into the company’s close ties to the UK Government, its
lobbying activities in the EU and the close exchange between company representatives and
policymakers in Brussels.
Lobbying is difficult to pin down, and there is no definite definition of lobbying. The complex
nature of the activity in fact explains the debates around its rules and regulations (OECD 2012,
23). The European Council defines lobbying as the “concerted effort to influence policy
formulation and decision making with a view to obtaining some designated result from
government authorities and elected representatives. In a wider sense, the term may refer to […]
‘public affairs’ activities by various institutions (associations, consultancies, advocacy groups,
[…] etc.); in a more restrictive sense, it would mean the protection of economic interests by the
corporate sector (corporate lobbying) commensurate to its weight on a national or global scene”
(Zibold 2013, 1).
Firms are formally recognized as lobbyists at EU institutions. The role of firms’ permanent
representatives in Brussels is to secure channels for access and influence (Coen 1997, 105). The
European Commission, on the other hand, benefits from firms’ supply of information to
policymakers (Ibid.; Bowen 1996, 51-9). This information supply on policy proposals is needed
at the level of EU policymaking to understand technical issues, their implications and the
political acceptability of proposed policies (Ibid.).
BP has around 20 staff members working in Brussels to maintain BP’s relationship with the
European Commission (Corporate Europe Observatory and Platform 2009a, 2). BP is a flagship
company that represents Europe across the world, and there is continuous dialogue between
commissioners, MEPs and company representatives with constant presence at EU institutions
(Ibid.). BP’s lobbying is done through at least 12 different trade associations (European
Commission Transparency Register 2015), with which the EU Commission holds close
consultations (Corporate Europe Observatory 2009a, 1). One of the main EU initiatives followed
by BP is EU’s policies and legislation on the climate change issue, including specifically, the EU
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ETS, explicitly stated (European Commission Transparency Register 2015). BP reports spending
between 2,750,000 € - 2,999,999 € in EU lobbying activities, and has five persons formally
accredited to access European Parliament premises (Ibid.). Documentary proof of exchanged
communication between BP and EU Commission officials is not available, but the following
discussion will provide details for several indicators.
First, BP was the first company to openly establish a link between its core operations and a major
global problem (Corporate Europe Observatory and Platform 2009b, 1-2). Back in 1997, John
Browne, then head of BP, stated in a landmark speech at Stanford University that it was time “to
consider the policy dimensions of climate change… [when it] is “taken seriously by the society
of which we are part. We in BP have reached that point” (Browne 1997). This differs
substantially from BP’s early opposition to climate-related regulations. In 1989, BP, was
together with other fossil fuel companies organized of the major coalition, the Global Climate
Coalition (GCC), which actively lobbied in international fora against state action for reducing
greenhouse gas emissions (Raustiala 102), doubting the scientific consensus on climate change
(Corporate Europe Observatory and Platform 2009, 1). BP left the GCC in 1997, and went on to
develop an internal emissions trading from 1998 to 2001. BP’s internal trading scheme traded the
right to emit tons of carbon dioxide in between its operation units across the world. It treated
emissions as a commodity with prices attached to them, although it did not include real money
transfers because of tax and accounting issues (Barry 2012).
At this time, close ties between BP and UK Government individuals were developing. These
close ties were most evident when David Simon, former Chairman of BP, described by then
Prime Minister Tony Blair, as one of Britain’s “most distinguished businessmen” leading BP
“with distinction,” was appointed to a top position at the Department of Trade and Industry
(BBC 1997). Mr. Simon, who upon taking this post became the Lord Simon of Highbury
(Encyclopædia Britannica), was not a member of the Labor Party, but as explained by Labor
Party spokesman, he was “head-hunted” by Tony Blair who was impressed after their first
meeting. He was appointed minister of Competitiveness in Europe within weeks of the election
of Britain’s New Labor government in 1997 (BBC 1997).

34
3.2.1 BP and the UK Emissions Trading Scheme
Through BP’s close ties with the UK government, the UK’s national emissions trading scheme
was constructed by people who could draw on BP’s experience and who were of close
connection or affiliation with BP (Corporate Europe Observatory and Platform 2009b, 10).
Margaret Mogford, who was then head of the environment unit at British Gas (BG), and wife to
John Mogford, 32-year-long executive vice president at BP and the initiator of BP’s internal
trading scheme, was seconded by BG to the UK Department for the Environment, becoming
head of the Emissions Trading Group secretariat and leading the initiative of designing the UK
trading scheme (Stephan 2011, 14; Gee 2011, 65; Meckling 2011). She worked on that task
under BP’s deputy chief executive at the time, Rodney Chase. The initiative was a joint project
between the UK department for the Environment and the Confederation of British Industry,
which was chaired by Rodney Chase. He has led the program’s four-month feasibility study
(Cowe 1999). In his speech at a conference he gave in Washington D.C. in the year 2000,
Rodney Chase said, “Let’s try to make it work nationally and internationally,” in reference to
emissions trading. With regard to skepticism around its practicality, he said, “it is this aspect
which ourselves and the British Government are working jointly to overcome” (Chase 2000). It
was reported by the Guardian at the time that a group of companies including BP were
participating in the process of setting the scheme’s details (Cowe 1999).
The group designed the national scheme based on BP’s model (Corporate Europe Observatory
and Platform 2009b, 4), and in ways that further benefitted the corporation. First, incentives were
distributed to industry, including BP, to encourage them to participate in the national scheme.
Thirty four voluntary participants were recruited, which happened to be the largest industrial
emitters, and these were the ones which received the incentives for participation (Ibid.). BP was
the fourth largest participant and received £18.9 million in incentives (National Audit Office
2004, 35; Committee of Public Accounts 2004, Ev.11), which it used to further invest in other
emission reduction projects (National Audit Office 2004, 19).
BP’s contribution can be summarized as playing a significant role in designing the UK ETS, the
latter subsequently becoming a model for the design of the EU ETS. For in addition to having
encouraged the development of the EU ETS, the UK ETS also had influence on its design
(National Audit Office 2004, 2). The UK Department of Environment claimed that it was a key
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player in the development of the European Trading Scheme and many aspects of its model were
replicated in designing the EU ETS (Ibid.). One of these aspects is the use of free distribution
and the first allocation of permits to heavy polluters upon the launch of the scheme. This is
despite the fact that the initial free distribution of allowances led to over-allocation and
oversupply of allowances in the UK national scheme (Dunn 2003, 33), which was also the
repeated outcome with the EU ETS (European Commission 2015), where sellers offered excess
permits and potential buyers refrained (Dunn 2003, 33).
The UK ETS was so designed so as to further allow trade associations to have a say in how it is
run. The UK ETS allows trade associations to negotiate the targets for the respective sector
before allowances are distributed to the different sectors (Barry 2012, 9). This was also one
aspect of the EU ETS, which included industry in its early consultation processes and involved
private actors in setting the technical details. These industry representatives have, in addition to
providing technical knowledge, had a say in setting the general market structure and the level of
state involvement. The following paragraph will provide an example.
3.2.2 BP and Industry Involvement in the Design of the EU ETS
This paragraph will look in detail at one meeting that the EU Commission has convened for the
sake of consultation with industry representatives. It was held in the year 2001, as part of the
policy design process before the official launch of the EU ETS Directive in 2003 formally
establishing the emissions trading scheme.
The consultation meeting included a number of different figures affiliated with BP, who
participated at the meeting in their capacity as different stakeholders. Michael Wriglesworth,
who was BP’s chief lobbyist in Brussels at the time (Ellerman, Convery and de Perthuis 2010,
28), was present at the meeting representing the Union for Industrial and Employers’
Confederation of Europe (UNICE), now called BusinessEurope, a trade association of which BP
is a prominent member. (The same person was advisor to the Center of European Policy Studies
(CEPS), and was member of its task force for later reviewing the EU ETS (Center for European
Policy Studies 2006)). Also present at the consultation meeting was Margaret Mogford, former
head of British Gas’ Environment Unit who was the leading secretariat for the initiative of
designing the UK ETS, and who was working in that regard with BP’s deputy chief Ronald
Chase, wife of John Mogford, BP’s long executive vice president and main designer of it internal
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trading scheme. She attended representing the UK Emissions Trading Group, whereas Charles
Nicholson, Group Senior Advisor for BP, came representing the World Business Council for
Sustainable Development (WBCS). Jan-Peter Hughes, later vice-president at BP, also
participated at the meeting representing ENER-G8, a coalition of eight energy intensive
manufacturing companies, representing the interests of firms as energy consumers (Greenwood
and Aspinwall 1998, 121, 201).
BP was, in addition, represented by CEFIC (the European Chemicals Industry Council) and
through EUROPIA (the European Petroleum Industry Association), and the World Wide Fund
for Nature (WWF), a charity that owned a considerable amount of shares at BP at the time of the
meeting (McCarthy 2015), the International Association of Industrial Oil and Gas Producers and
the European Roundtable of Industrialists, a group of 48 of the largest multinationals which is
known to be at the forefront of promoting industry self-regulation and to have privileged access
to EU and national decision-makers (Corporate Watch 2005). Each of these had one or more
delegates participating as stakeholders in the discussion (European Commission 2001a). BP was
thereby represented through at least 30-38% of the participants in the consultation meeting, if
one is to take into account only the delegations with which it explicitly closely coordinates.
This meeting saw an overwhelming consensus in favor of emissions trading, with the majority
preferring a sooner rather than later launch. In this meeting, industry representatives expressed
their insistence that emissions trading be a matter of choice, and that companies should only
trade when it is efficient for them to do so. It is a new “tool to enhance cost-effectiveness,” that
should therefore primarily serve that goal and it should thus be a matter of choice whether to
participate in the regulatory scheme or not which should be primarily targeted to those prepared
to take on the operation of an installation with a target. The level of the emission reduction
targets would be key on whether to join or not (European Commission 2001a, 2). This has indeed
been taken into account in the final form of the Directive adopted, which allows application for
the temporary exclusion of certain installations from being covered by the scheme according to
whether the operating firm is prepared to take on the target (Official Journal of the European
Union 2003, 39).
Some energy-intensive producers present at the meeting argued for the free allocation of
allowances, and argued against ‘absolute’ targets, rather proposing either relative or specific
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targets. Allocation by benchmarking was also proposed, since benchmarking inherently favors
the position of those who took early action vis-à-vis others. The suggestion for benchmarking
was explicitly made for the purpose of taking into account and compensating corporations that
already took early action. These include primarily BP, Shell and those corporations that took part
in the UK ETS. This was taken into consideration in the design of the EU ETS, which stated that
“benchmarks […] concerning the best available technologies may be employed, […] and these
can incorporate an element of early action” (Ibid, 43).
In discussions of monitoring and compliance, the Chairman acknowledged the important role
that private sector verification firms would play, given their experience and technical knowledge.
Private sector organizations which have been working in monitoring activities, it was agreed,
will therefore be involved in developing monitoring standards for this directive and for
developing future monitoring guidelines for other greenhouse gas emissions (EU Commission
2001, 6).
Moreover, most participants expressed that there was no need for provision for market
organization and that the “the market would find its own solutions” (EU Commission 2001, 5).
When the point was raised that states should intervene to smooth out peaks and troughs in prices,
there was no support for the idea, and instead, there was “mistrust” with regard to the
“intervention” of public authorities in private markets (Ibid).
One can therefrom observe private stakeholders’ preference for a deregulatory system, in which
private organizations take up the monitoring, verification and compliance standard-setting and
activities, and with preference for no or minimum intervention by the state. From the
participants’ point of view, the benefit from state policy and regulations is that they would “level
the playing field” for market participants, by assuming a target that ultimately determines the
environmental value of policies. It is expected from states that they ensure and enhance that
‘level playing field’ (Ibid, 2-3). The market value can actualize only when there is this
commitment to a target, which can only be effected by institutional economy-wide policies.
This example shows how lobbying activities are done through trade associations in an ‘industry
consultation’ framework carried out by EU Commission authorities. It also supports the view
that political outcomes are influenced by how successfully businesses build networks and
coalitions which constitute a key source of business power (Meckling 2011b), influencing
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decision-making to what is in their favor. This is seamlessly in line with the definition of
lobbying outlined above, understood by the European Council as concerted efforts to influence
policy through ‘public activities’ and associations to obtain results from authorities and to secure
corporate interests. The next paragraph will further elaborate and provide evidence on the
argument on the desire for states to take action on climate change only in ways that benefit
corporate interests.
3.3

Climate Action with Minimal State Intervention

BP’s efforts at promoting its interests can be seen in its push for states to take climate action and
environmental commitment as long as it means expanding the emissions trading market, and
allowing for smooth profitable transactions. BP’s efforts to promote emissions trading at the
international level, both directly and indirectly, however, contrast with its seemingly paradoxical
preference for preventing any state intervention after states take climate action, restricting the
desired state action to setting the market, the caps and the regulations and providing the legal
framework for its operations.
BP generally works on promoting emissions trading worldwide. It supports a global price for
carbon, and advocates for emissions trading schemes. It states on its website, that it “long
supported measures to put a price on carbon emissions,” and that it will continue “to raise its
advocacy this year” (BP 2015). Robert Dudley, BP’s current chief executive wrote to the
UNFCCC in June this year that “if governments act to price carbon, this […] encourages the
most efficient ways of reducing emissions widely” (Ibid). Dudley is working closely together
with CEOs of other oil and energy companies to support national and international actions to put
a price on carbon (Ibid.). Michael Wriglesworth, a long-time official at BP, and currently senior
advisor at the International Emissions Trading Association (IETA), has also been actively
promoting market-based systems and flexible compliance mechanisms for businesses to trade in
greenhouse gas emissions in international conferences for the past years (Wriglesworth 2004;
Committee on Public Administration, Regional Development and the Environment 2004). BP is
member of this International Emissions Trading Association, which carries out a strong
campaign for carbon trading, and is in that regard supported by BP (IETA 2015).
BP is also working on expanding carbon markets worldwide, through World Bank-facilitated
workshops on emissions trading, providing technical advice and selling its own emissions
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trading scheme as a model to potential nation- and region-wide consumers, such as in China and
Brazil (Barry 2012; Business Environmental Leadership Council 2015). Since BP was involved
in developing the UK ETS in the year 2000, Rodney Chase, chairman of BP at the time, was
actively promoting emissions trading both nationally and in the US. He addressed his audience at
the Pew Center-Chatham House conference in Washington, saying “the signal is there and we in
business will be better placed if we recognize and act on that.” He also says, “if I had to pick just
one innovative policy solution, it would be this,” detailing the benefits of a cap-and-trade system
as the main action to address climate change on a national and international level.
In Germany, Peter Sutherland, as then-chairman of BP and Goldman Sachs, gave a speech at
Germany’s economic conference, the Wirtschaftsrat 2007, titled ‘Economy, Climate Change and
Energy Supply,’ in which he strongly supported emissions trading, saying, “we should use the
power of the market to deliver the most efficient solutions, particularly through emissions
trading”, and additionally advocated for the use of incentives for private sector organizations to
participate which is a controversial feature of trading schemes both in the UK and the EU. He
says, “we should also accept that transitional incentives are needed to encourage the introduction
of new technologies and to drive down their cost.” He contrasts emissions trading with taxation
in favor of the former, stating that “we prefer the market mechanism of trading as this imposes a
definite ceiling on emissions and releases the power of the market to drive efficiency.” In
praising the market-based regulation already established by the EU, he says, “the market
economy has delivered growth, innovation and employment. It has lifted billions out of poverty.
And it will also help to deliver the energy future that we need” (Wirtschaftsrat 2007).
BP urges government to take action on climate change, portraying the current situation as
unacceptable and requiring urgent intervention. Robert Dudley, BP’s chief executive, therefore
calls for a “widely-applied” global market price for carbon. This, he says, “provides the right
incentives for everyone to play their part,” the global carbon price in this context being
constructed as the only and right alternative to other policies that give rise to disagreements. He
says, “Identifying in advance which changes are likely to be most effective is fraught with
difficulty. This underpins the importance of policy-makers taking steps that lead to a global price
for carbon” (Crtichlow 2015).
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However, carbon pricing is promoted when it stands with connection with emissions trading
systems, not with taxes. It is opposed when it means enforcing lower caps, i.e. higher emission
reduction targets. Howard Chase, BP’s former director of European Government Affairs, and
who was also Sherpa to the European Commission High Level Group on Competitiveness,
Energy and the Environment is generally opposed to interference in market mechanisms, and
favors flexible market-based, non-costly environmental regulation. He expresses his opinion with
regard to the current problem on the emissions trading market relating to the oversupply of
allowances, and with regard to Germany and France’s concern about the very cheap price of EU
carbon allowances, stating that there was no need to drive up carbon prices. He thinks that the
problem should be sorted out by the market. He says, “If you're an industrial operator, the
scheme is the scheme is the scheme. We should not be interfering with it in the current trading
period” (emphasis added). The company he is currently leading after BP, Dow Chemical
Company, is an energy intensive manufacturing company and campaigns for exemption from EU
regulation. Otherwise, he argues, companies including the one he is leading, will soon be moving
their operations elsewhere where environmental regulation is less costly (Lewis 2015).
It appears from statements such as these and from the consultation meeting described above that
BP’s own lobbying activities combined with its lobbying through other trade associations,
including carbon-intensive companies, supports climate action that serves to enhance the marketmechanism, make trade flow more smoothly between systems or extend trading systems to other
regions and link them. However, their efforts serve to prevent stronger climate action in terms of
reducing the caps (i.e. setting higher reduction targets) or intervening to increase the allowance
price.
This chapter has moreover shown how one company could gain access to designing a marketbased instrument that was in its interest. Through close ties with government officials, through
participation in and through numerous trade associations in lobbying activities, and through
widely advocating and promoting the policy option for which it already provided a model, BP
could have a say in how a national and international trading scheme was to be set up. The
adoption of a market-based mechanism will necessarily require the involvement of industry in its
design, rules and its monitoring. It requires that industry have a say in policymaking where
interested businesses can widely participate through numerous trade associations, exercising
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influence without monitoring the interests that they derive from the rules and policy design they
defend. However, these corporate interests could not have been met without state support
(Lederer 2012a). The following chapter will look at the alignment of state interests with these
corporate interests.
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4
4.1

States and Carbon Markets

State Interests

Emissions trading is frequently justified by state leaders using a realpolitik notion that views it as
the only strategy that can be implemented at a time when all other strategies have failed. The
issue is often justified using a rhetoric of facing a problem of such urgency, that the method to be
adopted has to be the one that is most likely to work (Baldwin 2008, 271). This is one way to
make such actions be perceived as benevolent, especially by green pressure groups which
actively pressure states to take action. States would then be seen as addressing an issue of
catastrophic risks in an emergency situation (Baldwin 2008, 271). This has made a movement
like Friends of the Earth receive the EU emissions trading scheme, for example, as a potentially
“huge step forward in the race to tackle climate change” (Friends of the Earth 2004). The
following paragraph will further discuss why states would opt for emissions trading as their
primary strategy to address the climate issue.
First, the quantification of emissions benefits decision-makers in that it places a monetary value
on the issue of the environment. It uses the economic language that leaders can deal with
(O’Neill 1997, 546), by making the environmental crisis more visible in decision-making in
terms of coding it as a calculable factor that can stand in quantifiable relationships with other
factors and economic objects (Lohmann 2009a, 500). This has a range of benefits. It allows for
taking decisions that involve the trading off of one thing for another, and which are justified and
which can be defended as maximizing (economic) well-being (Ibid; O’Neill 1997, 546). This
involves the following reasoning.
When climate change is identified as a problem of resource scarcity, the immediate response is to
set property rights for investors. To effectively rationalize the use of these resources, the market
is identified as the most efficient site for resource allocation. This is where the idea of
commodifying the product fits, so that it is dealt with in terms of calculable tradeable units
(Carbon Trade Watch 2003, 13). This is also true with regard to decisions on the functioning of
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already existing trading schemes7. When the environment as object is transformed into
commercial ‘goods and services’, it is markets which determine the real value of the
environment. Trade and its involved processes then become environmentalist action (Lohmann
2009a, 500). By taking this climate action, states are also not expected to take other climate
actions which prove to be more costly, and which involve the more difficult decisions and thorny
issues (Baldwin 2008).
Second, it allows the demand and responsibility for taking climate action to shift away from
states, which makes emissions trading be perceived as a politically convenient policy option for
states (Ibid., 262). States would provide the initial permissions and the overall regulatory
framework, but can then benefit from private actors’ involvement in governance functions and
from the subsequent self-regulatory system for standard-setting and monitoring, where the
burden of implementation lies in the hands of the private sector. Although the setting up of
carbon markets is costly, since governments spend money on setting and enforcing caps,
developing the legal and measurement tools, and allocating quotas to the industries under its
jurisdiction (Lohmann 2011, 95), subsequent market operations save states from bearing all
regulation costs (Falkner 2003, 77) and portrays emissions trading as a ‘cost-free’ method for
efficient and accountable emissions control (Baldwin 2008, 270). It also saves money spent on
subsidizing climate action (Lohmann 2011, 96)
Instead, it actually generates funding from the market, collected or received in the form of fines,
taxes, and the auctioning for emission allowances (depending on the scheme or its
implementation phase). One OECD study estimated substantial potential fiscal revenues to be
achieved from implementing market instruments (Dellink, Briner and Clapp 2010). It estimated
that if Annex 1 countries8, in committing to their Copenhagen pledges, used carbon taxes or cap-

7

One example of this can be found in the implementation of the EU ETS, whereby decisions on the amount of
allowances made available during the different implementation phases are less a function of political dynamics (such
as the urgency, the need or the public demand for showing that action for the environment is being taken seriously
and that caps are lowered accordingly) but are primarily based on market dynamics and calculations relating to the
projected economic performance under the different scenarios and/or in response to market signals arising during the
implementation phases.
8

Annex 1 countries are the group of countries with emission reduction targets, mostly industrialized countries in the
North, included in Annex 1 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which
included all OECD countries in the year 1990 and all economies in transition. These countries had pledged to reduce
their emissions, together or individually, to their 1990 emissions level by the year 2000 (IPCC 2007, 77).

44
and-trade schemes with auctioned allowances, would receive an estimated total revenue of $400
billion (Ibid.). For the other non-Annex 1 countries, the global offset market to generate carbon
credits from ‘sustainable development’ projects provides another source of funds. In its National
Climate Change Response Strategy, the South African national Department of Environmental
Affairs and Tourism stated that the “Clean Development Mechanism […] could be a very
important source of foreign direct investment”, and that it “presents a range of commercial
opportunities”, some of them substantial (2004).
The alignment of state and corporate interests result in carbon trade and carbon markets often
perceived as the answer for the search for a regulatory ‘solution’ (Spash 2010, 169). Cap-andtrade systems in general are perceived as ‘win-win’ solutions, since they allow cooperation
between states and the domestic private sector, instead of having to negotiate standards at the
international level (Falkner 2003, 77), impose compliance costs on the private sector at the
domestic level (Baldwin 2008, 270), and possibly face strong opposition from industries who
perceive high environmental standards as a threat. As Gordon Brown once put it, “A global
carbon market is at the heart of our approach- not the old way of rigid regulation, but the modern
way: working with the market, harnessing its power […] incentivising the most efficient and
innovative ways of tackling climate change” (The Telegraph 2007). As a policy option, it is
implementable both for policy makers and actors. Providing the quantified targets in the form of
emission caps, and the procedural framework for attaining them allows different countries and
the different domestic actors involved to negotiate and agree on the level of emission caps
(Baldwin 2008, 271).
Most importantly, emissions trading does not constitute a break from existing institutional and
political arrangements in the international system. Environmental concerns are being addressed
without a major or fundamental restructuring of economic and political institutions. Instead, the
importance of economic development alongside and despite of environmental damage continues
to be consolidated in international treaty-making. This is true in environmental treaties for
climate change. Far from being questioned, the connection between economic growth and
environmental protection is rearticulated and institutionalized. International development
institutions and trade regimes sometimes reported to support projects with potential
environmental destruction in certain parts of the world are unaffected by this development. The
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World Bank, despite controversy surrounding environmental hazards by some of its projects in
the last decades, further supports clean ‘offset’ projects in developing countries, without having
these aspects of its role questioned and without important changes made to its funding priorities
(Litfin 1993, 108; Newell 2011, 78). Instead, this emissions trading regime develops alongside
other narrowly focused environmental regimes, representing a piecemeal approach to global
ecological governance (Litfin 1993, 108). The non-state actors involved carry out practices that
can coexist with the traditional unreformed path toward global environmental cooperation (Ibid,
111).
Former Director General of the WTO, Pascal Lamy, sees a strong connection between the
opening of trade, and addressing climate change. In the run-up to the Copenhagen meeting in
2009, he calls for change and the necessity to include an agreement that successfully engages all
major polluters. He says, “[t]he world cannot continue with ‘business as usual,’” explaining,
“there is a profound need for a successful conclusion to the current negotiations on both climate
change and trade opening” (WTO 2009). These parallel concerns with trade opening and global
market integration are important features of the state-conducted institutionalization of marketbased climate policies. The following will show how this is the case.
4.2

Toward Institutionalizing the Market-Based Approach

The following will show the extent to which the connection between open trade and economic
development goals on the one hand, and environmental protection on the other, have assumed
importance and been institutionalized in the treaties and agreements of the 1992 Rio Earth
Summit, the Kyoto Protocol, and in the 2009 Copenhagen Accord, providing the necessary
political and legal framework for the pursuit of market instruments and trade.
The Rio Declaration states that “[n]ational authorities should endeavour to promote the
internalization of environmental costs and the use of economic instruments […], with due regard
to the public interest (Rio Declaration, Principle 16, emphasis added). Establishing a causal link
between an ‘open’ international economic systems and solving environmental problems was
clearly articulated in the declaration stating that, “[s]tates should cooperate to promote a
supportive and open international economic system that would lead to economic growth and
sustainable development in all countries, to better address the problems of environmental
degradation” (Rio Earth Declaration, Principle 12, emphasis added). It was also agreed that,
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“[n]ational authorities should endeavour to promote the internalization of environmental costs
[…], with due regard to the public interest and without distorting international trade and
investment” (Rio Declaration, Principle 16, emphasis added). The Earth Summit agreements
included the legally binding United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UN
1997). At one instance, it places the protection of international trade in such a high position that
it warns that “measures taken to combat climate change, including unilateral ones, should not
constitute […] a disguised restriction on international trade” (UNFCCC 1992, p. 10, Article 3:4,
emphasis added).
Similarly, the treaty to the Kyoto Protocol adds to the use of market-based tools the protection of
markets. It includes as one of its principles, the “[p]rogressive reduction or phasing out of market
imperfections, […]and subsidies in all greenhouse gas emitting sectors that run counter to the
objective of the Convention and application of market instruments;” (Kyoto Protocol 1998, p.2,
Article 2:1 (v), emphasis added). To ensure that measures to combat climate change do not
conflict with the protection of free and open markets, it includes a clause stating that “[t]he
Parties included in Annex I shall strive to implement policies and measures under this Article in
such a way as to minimize adverse effects, including […] effects on international trade, and
social, environmental and economic impacts on other Parties …” (Kyoto Protocol, p.3, Article
2:3, emphasis added).
It also includes clauses that provide room for flexibility allowing parties to minimize the costs of
important measures that are necessary for setting appropriate national emission caps. It says, “All
Parties, taking into account their common but differentiated responsibilities and their specific
national and regional development priorities, objectives and circumstances […] shall [f]ormulate,
where relevant and to the extent possible, cost-effective […] programmes to improve the quality
of local emission factors, activity data and/or models which reflect the socio-economic
conditions of each Party” (Kyoto Protocol, p.9, Article 10:a, emphasis added). It also states that
“in the implementation of their commitments under this Protocol […] a certain degree of
flexibility shall be allowed by the Conference of the Parties […] to the Parties included in Annex
I undergoing the process of transition to a market economy” (Ibid., p.4, Article 3:6, emphasis
added).
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Later, the Copenhagen Convention was held after emissions trading systems were set up, and the
references to investments and market instruments were used in reference to mitigation efforts. It
was declared in the accord, “We decide to pursue various approaches, including opportunities to
use markets, to enhance the cost-effectiveness of, and to promote mitigation actions. Developing
countries, especially those with low emitting economies should be provided incentives to
continue to develop on a low emission pathway” (Copenhagen Accord 2009, emphasis added).
These incentives help constitute the acceptability of trading instruments, which supports the view
that it is rather how carbon markets are received, rather than their effective reduction of
greenhouse-induced climate change, which provides grounds for why it is a popular policy
option (Baldwin 2008).
Emissions trading’s burgeoning popularity among government leaders (Spash 2010, 169) and
non-state, private market actors, can thus be explained by the fact that it is non-threatening to the
most powerful interests (Baldwin 2008, 262). It is a policy option that promotes a self-regulatory
model benefitting the interests of powerful corporations (Falkner 2003, 84), and allowing
governments to avoid what can be perceived as inefficient “command-and-control” regulation
perceived as costly both for governments and businesses (Lohmann 2011, 96). The creation of
carbon markets does not lead to a shift away from using carbon, but creates permits to produce
certain amounts.
Baldwin draws attention to how emissions trading as a regulatory mechanism has been taken up
as ‘good’ regulatory mechanism based not on regulatory merit, but on its ‘acceptability’. This
draws attention to the processes by which regulatory systems are accorded legitimacy (Baldwin
2008). The following will look at the construction of legitimacy for carbon markets and for
market instruments more generally. Themes that construct markets as the favorable means to
address climate change use discourse pertaining to an ‘efficient’, ‘cost-effective’, ‘flexible’ or
‘quick’ ‘solution’.
Upon launching the EU Emissions Trading Scheme in 2005, the then EU Commissioner for the
Environment, Margot Wallström, described emissions trading as a “major innovation for
environmental policy in Europe,” and said, “we are determined to use market forces to achieve
our climate objectives in the most cost-conscious way”. This includes the creation of market
structures in a way that is compatible with emerging international emission markets, and
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establishing ‘trust’ in the new trading system (European Commission 2001b). In advance of the
G8 St. Petersburg meeting focusing on energy, then British Finance Minister Gordon Brown
made a strong pitch at the United Nations “for a global carbon trading market as the best way to
protect the endangered environment while spurring economic growth.” Arguments on the market
as the only possible way to allocate resources (Carbon Trade Watch 2003, 13), and one that
should be pursued given the urgency of the crisis and the need to implement mechanisms that
work are usually contrasted with direct taxation or ‘command-and-control’ regulation (Lohmann
2009b, 25).
Also showing how involving businesses in carbon market construction and making them have a
stake in the regulatory system can be of benefit to governments at the domestic level is the
following. In his speech for the announcement of the newly created Clean Power Plan, President
Barack Obama mentions, as one of the project’s merits, the fact that it “give[s] states the time
and the flexibility they need to cut pollution in a way that works for them”, in reference to
federal states. He says, that states “can already build on the progress that our communities and
businesses are already making,” an example of which being that “nearly a dozen states have
already set up their own market-based programs to cut their carbon pollution” (White House
2015b). In his memo on climate change, he states, “we’ve been working with states and power
companies to make sure they’ve got the flexibility they need to cut this pollution- all while
lowering energy bills and ensuring reliable service” (White House 2015a).
As they distribute permits to already polluting firms, and turn these permits into assets, this will
make previous opposing firms, now as holders of carbon assets, be in favor of state action that
would result in making these assets scarcer, because their assets thereby become more valuable.
They would be looking forward for higher standards, more restrictions, lower caps and better
enforcement because these are essential for the carbon market to exist and for their assets to have
a commodity value in the market (Bernstein et al. 2010, 172; Baldwin 2008). Legally binding
emission reduction targets on the international level would be essential for securing the global
demand for offsets (Bernstein et al. 2010, 172). Also, making these decisions be of a permanent
nature insures that investments made in clean technologies, low-carbon and carbon-reducing
products will find a promising market in the future (Stern 2006).
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This might explain why the arrangement on emissions trading has not been seriously challenged
in any international forum (Bachram 2004, 6), despite much criticism, where the environmental
effectiveness and the moral value of carbon trading have been questioned (Ibid; Meckling 2011,
26). It is to this issue that we will turn to in the next chapter.
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5

Carbon Markets in Practice

Even though it can be argued that all systems carry difficulties, and that even command-andcontrol regulation can be subject to manipulation by the more powerful, there are reasons to
believe that carbon pollution markets give advantages to polluters over non-polluters, provide
particular incentives for manipulation, and carry difficulties in holding to transparency and
accountability during their operation (Baldwin 2008, 271). Much depends on the implementation
of a trading scheme, the version of the trading scheme applied, and how much space is available
for corrective steps to be taken (Baldwin 2008, 271). But as two authors put it, customers buying
carbon allowances to replace their carbon footprint may be buying “good feelings and little else”
(Fahrenholdt and Mufson 2007).
This chapter will present reasons for why it is proposed that carbon markets be viewed from a
critical perspective. It shows how the framework in which they were constructed as favorable
does not reflect the consequences of their operation in practice. These pertain to the social
inequalities and ecological destruction that market-based policies aggravate in the guise of
serving benevolent economic development goals. This chapter engages this critical perspective
and in so doing provides insights into the related themes that traditional IR theories do not
usually take into account and which Green IR Theory highlights and attempts to include in IR
analyses. This pulls together the argument for why Green IR theory is the preferred framework to
study this environmental issue and the policies devised to address it. It also includes the
arguments and evidence for why this policy served to entrench the use of fossil fuels more firmly
(Lohmann 2011, 96), and how in an unregulated market, credits allowing for further producing
carbon emissions can be generated from projects lacking the necessary and sufficient monitoring;
projects that in some cases were going to be implemented anyway (Fahrendthold and Mufson
2007).
5.1

Issues of fairness and redistribution

The view by advocates that carbon trading is ‘fair’ (Baldwin 2008, 270; Caney 2010, 205;
Wriglesworth 2004) usually draws on the short-term gains for non-polluting parties. The
argument on fairness was, for instance, explained by Polly Toynbee using for illustration the
example of markets for trading personal carbon allowances for individuals as follows: if energy
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quotas were distributed equally to the public and trade on the open market was allowed, those
who can’t afford high-energy lifestyles will sell their quotas to those who need them for, say,
frequent flying, driving high-energy-consuming cars, etc. This has the re-distributional effect of
letting money flow from the richer to the poorer as the rich pay for their high-energy-consuming
lifestyles (2006).
This view is, however, challenged by the argument that these exchange activities in fact limit the
poor’s accessibility and entitlement to carbon-consuming activities and, instead, restrict these
activities to the wealthy (Baldwin 2008, 270). On the level of national and regional markets
covering industrial installations, pollution permits are granted or auctioned to polluting private
firms (Lohmann 2009b, 26), and the distribution of ‘free’ property rights is largely in proportion
to how much they were already polluting (Lohmann 2005, 205). The result is that the biggest
polluters become the winners, the owners of an asset that is valued on the market, while the
losers in that trading scheme are those who start off with fewer allocations. The market is
therefore skewed toward the more powerful players, since the ones most rewarded are the past
polluters (Baldwin 2008, 271). This moreover accepts the position of the biggest polluters as
given and allocates financial compensation to less-polluting parties, who would sell away their
permits. The foregone opportunities for sellers of allocations is thereby not taken into
consideration (Ibid.). The portrayal of emissions trading as ‘fair’ thus captures only short-term
gains for less well-off actors and does not account for their later long-term losses (Ibid, 270).
5.2

The Argument on ‘Third World Development’

Carbon offsets are often claimed to have a redistributive or “Third World development” purpose
(Lohmann 2011, 97). In practice, enclosed investment projects for ‘clean’ business initiatives can
have serious effects on the host community. It was determined, for instance, by a United Nations
Development Program fact-finding mission that a dam in Panama’s Tabasará River’s site would
undermine the subsistence and way of life for the inhabiting Ngäbe community, and that it would
possibly flood the community’s historical, religious and cultural sites. The Ngäbe people were
not consulted in the decision-making process for establishing this project and the Barro Blanco
Dam was eventually certified as a viable CDM project by the CDM Executive Board certified
this project as CDM project despite documentation of its likely harmful effects (Ervine 2015,
247-8).
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The decision-making process for the certification of CDM projects is a process that is limited to
the certain considerations related to assessment of additionality and baseline (Bernstein et al.
2010, 169). The process for generating carbon offsets therefore sometimes involves activities
that conflict with sustainable development norms. Although some private standard-setters try to
add social and biodiversity protocols and/or sustainability assessments to their carbon offset
methodologies, these are not derived from real development concerns. One example is emission
reduction from deforestation and degradation (REDD), as a carbon credit generating activity,
which is gaining increased acceptance (Bernstein et al. 2010, 169), despite some of its associated
adverse environmental effects. This involves the privatization of forests and their placement
under corporate or state control as potential investment projects, keeping forest dwellers and
forest communities out of the enclosed sites which they have been traditionally using (Böhm and
Dhabi 2009).
More importantly, the concern with attracting investment projects can often come at the expense
of direct and committed attention to existing catastrophic problems in need of urgent adequate
interference and structural rectification at their sites. In July 2007, Sajida Khan, an
internationally known environmental activist died of cancer at her home in Durban, meters away
from a waste heap containing toxic chemicals. This site, called Bisasar, is kept as a potential
investment project under the Clean Development Mechanism. Bisasar was the highest-profile
CDM project in South Africa, a methane-to-electricity conversion project, at a cancerous site
outside Durban, where she lived, which she had long struggled to have removed (Bond 2007, 7)9.
This site was going to be a very profitable business, given the amount of waste it would help
remove, thus, generating a large amount of carbon offsets.
Therefore, the designation of an instrument as ‘cost-effective’ as widely used in policy
documents and business publications, is often misleading by not indicating the parties to whom
these policies will be cheap and cost-effective, and how (Carbon Trade Watch 2003, 12). Host
communities at investment sites in fact protest that offset finance is collected by businesspeople
and landowners only (Lohmann 2011, 97). The above were examples that show how that which

9

The site is located in a neighborhood inhabited predominantly by a black and brown community in Durban (Bond
2007, 7). The project is called a ‘win-win’ solution by its sponsors at the World Bank, Sajida Khan called it a
‘disaster’, which has caused sicknesses in many people in her community (Vedantam 2005).

53
is cheap and cost-effective to fossil-fuel industries can sometimes be expensive to these groups
(Carbon Trade Watch 2003, 12-13).
Proponents of carbon trading do acknowledge issues of development and social justice that
critics raise in connection to global carbon markets, but they do not acknowledge carbon
trading’s ‘built-in’ tendency to increase these inequalities (Baldwin 2008, 270). This strategy for
‘sustainable development’ in developing countries, resting on economic ‘integration’ and
openness and on attracting foreign investment, entrenches a structure with an unequal
distribution of economic and environmental costs between political and economic elites, on the
one hand, and communities in the Global South, on the other (Böhm, Misoczky and Moog 2012,
1619). Trading in itself does not do much to address the urgent catastrophic risks facing the
world, but only addresses the need to take action, and the desire for doing so with low costs
(Baldwin 2008, 271). Even if trading was inherently benevolent, it might not deliver the
acceptable set of outcomes through acceptable processes (Ibid.). As has been shown, it might
lead to a distortive shift in priorities (Rodrik 2005, 366). This contrasts with an approach that
would treat humans and non-human nature as ends in themselves, whose protection and survival
should be given priority over maintaining profit-generating practices in an economic growth
systems.
5.3

Complexity and lack of transparency

One supporter of carbon trading and founder of the largest carbon consulting firms,
EcoSecurities, describes REDD projects as “the most mind twistingly complex endeavor in the
carbon game”, further explaining in detail, “the fact is that REDD involves scientific
uncertainties, technical challenges, heterogeneous noncontiguous asset classes, multi-decade
performance guarantees, local land tenure issues”, and admits that generating offset carbon
credits from forest conservation project involve “a brutal potential for gaming” (Stuart 2009).
The hypothesis from economic theory about the efficient reduction in emissions resulting from
emission markets rests on the assumption of perfect information (Brohé, Eyre and Howarth
2009, 46-7). This assumption is impossible to maintain in the complex conditions that exist in
both the formulation of regulation and the operation of the markets (Spash 2010, 169-170) such
as involved in setting the targets and emission caps, designing the scheme and allowing for
variation according to industry, prior involvement in the market, and the specific circumstances
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for certain emitting installations. This also includes the handling of large-scale transfer and
management of financial assets through the design of economy-wide systems and mechanisms.
This complexity can affect the effectiveness of climate action while attention is possibly diverted
away from the need to switch away from the use of fossil fuels and into processes for designing a
system with financial derivatives, securities, insurance and offsets.
The impact on effectiveness is illustrated by the example of the Australian ETS, which was laid
out in a two-volume 280 paper with elaborate explanations and justifications for specific
positions and for which the Australian Senate proposed 210 amendments, which in November
2009, were eventually voted down for the second time. The similarly complex design issues and
sub-issues of the EU ETS meant that numerous suggestions and 80 proposed suggestions by
members of the European Parliament did not find consensual agreement, coherence and
direction, and actual changes were implemented only on relatively few issues. This complexity
tends to come at the expense of public transparency and accountability. In addition, it opens the
door for manipulation and the pursuit of hidden vested interests throughout the process.
Meanwhile, little actual greenhouse gas emission reductions may be attained (Spash 2010, 171),
when the primary concern becomes the development of financial instruments and the design of
the scheme, and not the effective or real reduction in emissions.
5.4

Financial market uncertainty

Offsets have been described as the most unusual of commodities, whose substance represents the
absence of something (Fahrendthold and Mufson 2007). The selling and buying of carbon
permits have quickly become financial transactions with promisingly growing value, already
generating billions of dollars per year (Spash 2010, 169). But criticisms associated with
financializing international climate policy concern the fact that carbon markets allow large-scale
trade in diverse, risky climate-based financial instruments, in which operations are carried out as
financial risk-taking and investment, placing the success or failure of climate policy at huge risk
of market collapse (Layfield 2013). Private actors would deal with climate policies in the form of
either risk management strategies or creating brand value. This increasingly creates a situation
which is no longer that of technical, limited trading used for the purpose of reducing the costs of
emissions cuts and ‘internalizing’ pollution costs, but which is becoming an expanding platform
for large-scale capital accumulation created, as mentioned above, through financial operations,
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speculation, the use of derivatives, intermediation, etc. (Lohmann 2011, 97-8). This has the
following implications.
These emission markets face the same issues that current financial markets face, “pressures from
capital markets, price volatility, boom and bust cycles, speculative bubbles,” among others
(Carbon Trade Watch 2003, 2). Right now, the EU ETS market is oversupplied by around 2
billion allowances (Carbon Market Watch 2015), this surplus mounting as a consequence of the
global financial crisis, which has more negatively affected the allowance market than was
anticipated (European Commission 2015), but which means that in the longer term, the EU will
have to lower its cap, (i.e. set higher reduction targets) at a faster rate of 2.2% per year instead of
the current 1.74% per year. On the short term, the EU would postpone (backload) the auctioning
of some allowances to reduce the supply, in addition to reviewing suggestions for structural
reforms in the market (Ibid). However, the structure of the commodities themselves is being
influenced by derivative traders (Lohmann 2011, 97), especially that insurance companies are
getting involved, indicating and further leading to a transformation of the political rationale to
address its problems (Newell and Paterson 1998, 679).
This transformation does not come from rethinking existing economic accumulation patterns. In
contrast, as one of its central assumptions, Green Theory begins with an understanding of the
existing system as the key and important cause of the existing environmental crises. Deep
environmental thought suggests that the only way to maintain a safe future for humanity and
other species is to make radical change to how we have heretofore organized social, political and
economic relations (Steans 2004, 219). This differs from the management mentality with which
the issue is currently approached (Ibid.).
5.5

Integrity issues

Some projects deliver results that are difficult to measure and which are designated with
emission reduction levels that are only estimated and hoped for. In the process of commodifying
the promise not to emit greenhouse gases, ensuring and certifying the integrity of these promises
is particularly challenging (Bernstein et al. 2010, 167). A series of scandals and accounting
controversies have been exposed with regard to offset projects in developing countries (Lohmann
2011, 97). In 2008, the US Government Accountability Office, a Congress-affiliated
investigative body, concluded in one study conducted on the offset market that carbon offset
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trading offers “limited assurance of credibility” to market participants to ensure that the credits
bring traded reflect real reductions in emissions.
In addition, since earning carbon-credit-generating projects certified by the Clean Development
Mechanism’s executive board are based on proposals submitted by those corporations or
investors which have a demand for these credits, the calculations for emission reductions that the
projects will cause are subject to the latter’s estimations. The amount of credits earned is
calculated as the difference between the projected level of emissions after the project is
implemented and the level of emissions that would occur had the project not existed. It is this
estimated amount of reduction for which credits are generated accordingly. Since the amount of
reduction is calculated as this difference, the ‘imagined’ future situation can well be exaggerated.
Therefore, corporations submitting proposals for credit-generating projects can earn allowances
to produce higher emissions than the emission cuts they help produce, thereby allowing for more
pollution that what is to be offset (Bachram 2004, 8).
Although quality assurance mechanisms are used, information on their use is limited, and the
extent of their use is uncertain. Since private actors take up standard setting and registry
functions on their own terms, questions about the consistency and accuracy of measuring and
monitoring are raised. In such settings where little external regulation is exercised, it is based on
the integrity of corporations that accurate reports on emission levels and reduction levels are
prepared. There are in fact many cases where private entities take up a number of these functions
with a conflict of interests involved. Firms can act both as advisory firms for carbon trading
schemes, as well as verifiers for the carbon credits generated (Bachram 2004, 8).
PriceWaterHouseCoopers, for example, acts both as accountant and consultant for polluting
firms, as well as verifier for emissions reductions. Others, like CH2M Hill and ICF Consulting
offer consulting, brokerage and verification services at the same time.
There are reasons to marginalize issues of accountability in discussions on carbon markets, given
the ‘effectiveness’ of this policy option in achieving the desired objectives or the perception that
there are no losers in trading mechanisms (Baldwin 2008, 271). Otherwise, notions of public
accountability can be replaced with accountability through markets (Ibid.). The actors on the
supply and demand side of transactions would monitor each other’s performance according to
market standards. However, delegating such governance functions to private actors furthers a
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deregulatory agenda that moves accountability and monitoring away from environmentalist
action, and precludes the exertion of pressure by environmentalist and activist groups. It serves a
separation between “democratic” and “market” systems (Baldwin 2008; Newell 2008b). The
market for greenhouse gases is thereby designed and managed by private entities and
organizations, away from public accountability and consultation by the public (Carbon Trade
Watch 2003, 1), thus away from a participatory, democratic, or accountable system and into the
hands of market actors in a less transparent system (Newell 2011).
Richard Sandor, a major carbon trader and promoter of carbon trade, says the creation of
commodities with financial value encourages polluters to take climate action. Whether they were
going to cut emissions anyway, without this financial incentive, he says, is “interesting, but not
my business. I’m running a for-profit company” (Ball 2008). It is observed that carbon trading
diverts attention away from the context of meaningful concerted action on climate change
(Corporate Europe Observatory and Platform 2009, 1), evading away the responsibility to switch
to climate-friendly technologies (Carbon Trade Watch 2003, 13). The Kyoto Protocol’s Clean
Development Mechanism, Joint Implementation, and ‘offset’ programs allow the necessary
fundamental changes to either be redefined or dismissed altogether (Bachram 2004, 11). Flexible
mechanisms of cap-and-trade systems incur minimal changes to the structure of economic
accumulation and growth (Böhm, Misoczky and Moog 2012, 1620). Also, in addition to
distracting efforts away from changing human behavior, institutional arrangements and
economic infrastructure (Spash 2010, 169), they provide a “moral cover” for the further and
continued consumption of fossil fuels (Bachram 2004, 11).
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6

Conclusions

As the World Bank has put it, “leaders are no longer asking whether they should price carbon but
are instead looking to the World Bank Group and others for technical advice as they determine
how to put carbon pricing into operation” (World Bank 2015b). The consensus and success of
carbon markets indicates a shift in policy-making whereby states increasingly look for the
private sector for regulatory mechanisms and provide them the framework for operating them.
The turn toward the belief in the capacity of markets to regulate and control efficiently and
creating the conditions for businesses to ultimately switch voluntarily to investing in clean,
environmentally-friendly technologies when it becomes cheaper for them to do so (Newell 2011)
shows how emissions trading ‘softens’ regulations for the private sector. It does not require
industries with high levels of carbon emissions to change their operations and shift away from
using carbon. Instead, businesses benefit from investing in carbon-generating projects both from
project implementation and operation directly, as well as from the offset ‘carbon credits’ that
they generate. Any extra carbon credits can be sold in the market to carbon brokers which will
sell them to other firms that need them to cover their emission levels.

This research attempted to show that the use of emissions trading is not necessarily explained by
its being the most efficient solution. Rather, it was explained by the fact that priority was given
to circumventing opposition from the most economically powerful actors that might be affected
(Baldwin 2008, 271). Polluters which already produced much emissions in industrialized
economies are now allowed to invest in Clean Development and other offset projects to buy
credits allowing them to continue producing carbon emissions. Polluters can thereby pay to make
someone else reduce their emissions, while not taking steps to reduce their own carbon footprint
(Bloomfield 2007).
However, if carbon markets do succeed as action for climate change, it will be a strategy that has
as its byproduct the entrenchment of social, environmental and economic injustices (Böhm,
Misoczky and Moog 2012, 1619). The real concerns about how economic processes destroy the
environment are sidelined or replaced in operating the new markets. Carbon trading is one form
for the expansion of the market into non-market spheres, while this extension of the market into
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nature and into non-market resources is arguably the root cause of the crisis. A solution would
therefore protect the environment from the world of commodity and exchange rather than to
extend the placement of monetary value to the environment (O’Neill 1997). It is proposed that an
effective policy would have replaced the investment in offsets by the pursuit of or the investment
in climate-friendly technology, lifestyles and consumption directly (Fahrenholdt and Mufson
2007). Maintaining a sustainable, livable climate requires keeping remaining fossil fuels
underground, and this requires “political mobilization” toward a non-fossil regime for energy
use, transport and consumption (Lohmann 2012, 4), and reducing non-renewable energy use
more generally. This would necessarily involve regulating vested interest groups (Spash 2010,
170).
6.1

Future Research

Through its linkage with energy and financial systems, carbon trading has moved environmental
policy to the heart of the world economy (Meckling 2011, 167). Whereas a distinction is often
made between ‘institutional ecological economics’ and free-market approaches to environmental
protection, many proposals are made to encourage synthesized forms of governance combining
the two (Slavíková, Kluvánková-Oravská, and Jílková 2011). Proposals for more market
mechanisms with “innovative incentives” are underway, and these are to be built on foundations
similar to the CDM, and are expected to guide future mitigation initiatives in developing
countries (Michaelova 2012). The development of voluntary deregulatory markets in the process
often indirectly contributes to the rules for standard-setting for the mandatory markets (Ervine
2011). The principles and rules that guide the voluntary regulatory systems need therefore be
looked at more closely with critical attention.
At the international level, these arrangements, like carbon markets, gradually assume dynamics
on their own, developed independently from inter-state negotiation processes and treaty-making
(Bernstein et al. 2010, 164). These could develop to involve issues that arise from the conflict
among businesses and how big businesses monopolize over standard-setting, for example,
weakening all the other market players (Falkner 2003, 84). These emerging patterns of markets
dominated by only a few powerful players would merit research on their own. This is particularly
significant when treated in connection with an ideological shift within the market-oriented liberal
paradigm, away from its free-market, competitive ideal (Falkner 2003, 84).

60
In addition, increased processes of fragmentation within the market will require subsequent
cooperation and coordination in terms of multilateral treaty-making for the purpose of agreeing
on the standards and rules to link various carbon markets together (Bernstein et al. 2010, 172).
The development of carbon markets might therefore actually pressure for increased cooperation
(Ibid, 172). It would be important, then, to study how, under increased pressure for state
coordination, the ongoing market development practices and the multilateral process and will
affect one another (Bernstein et al. 2010, 172).
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